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Constitutional Liquidation
William Baude*
Abstract. James Madison wrote that the Constitution’s meaning could be “liquidated” and
settled by practice. But the term “liquidation” is not widely known, and its precise meaning
is not understood. This Article attempts to rediscover the concept of constitutional
liquidation, and thereby provide a way to ground and understand the role of historical
practice in constitutional law.
Constitutional liquidation had three key elements. First, there had to be a textual
indeterminacy. Clear provisions could not be liquidated, because practice could “expound”
the Constitution but could not “alter” it. Second, there had to be a course of deliberate
practice. This required repeated decisions that reflected constitutional reasoning. Third,
that course of practice had to result in a constitutional settlement. This settlement was
marked by two related ideas: acquiescence by the dissenting side, and “the public
sanction”—a real or imputed popular ratification.
While this Article does not provide a full account of liquidation’s legal status at or after the
Founding, liquidation is deeply connected to shared constitutional values. It provides a
structured way for understanding the practice of departmentalism. It is analogous to
Founding-era precedent, and could provide a salutary improvement over the modern
doctrine of stare decisis. It is consistent with the core arguments for adhering to tradition.
And it is less susceptible to some of the key criticisms against the more capacious use of
historical practice.
* Professor of Law and Aaron Director Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law
School. This Article has been liquidated over time with the help of countless discussions
with friends and colleagues, as well as indispensable research assistance from Nickolas
Card, Margo Uhrman, Roberto Borgert, Douglas Gates, Kevin Keating, Martin Salvucci,
and Natalie Peelish; and research support from the SNR Denton and Alumni Faculty
Funds. This Article has benefitted as well from helpful comments by Akhil Amar,
Judge Stephanos Bibas, Curt Bradley, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Josh Chafetz, Nathan
Chapman, Andrew Coan, Ryan Doerfler, Justin Driver, Richard Epstein, Lee Fennell,
Chad Flanders, Jonathan Gienapp, Dick Helmholz, Randy Kozel, Alison LaCroix, Marty
Lederman, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Michael McConnell, Bernie Meyler, David
Pozen, Saikrishna Prakash, Richard Primus, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Lawrence Solum,
Lance Sorenson, David Strauss, Kevin Walsh, Garrett West, Adam White, and
Christopher Yoo; by workshop participants at Harvard, Stanford, the University of
Arizona, the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University
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Introduction
Today’s constitutional law looks to the past. The central document, of
course, is an old one whose age and origins cause constitutional debate. And
day-to-day judicial adjudication is often dominated by precedent, the
examination of past court decisions. But precedent and originalism do not
exhaust the role of historical argument in constitutional law. Constitutional
law is also rife with claims of authority by historical practice. Historical
practice is not quite the same as precedent, because it expands well beyond
judicial opinions. Historical practice is not quite the same as originalism, either,
because it frequently looks to what has happened in the generations after a text
was originally written.
Yet theories of how exactly such practice works as a source of
constitutional meaning are surprisingly scant, giving rise to the recent
allegation that “there has been little sustained academic attention to the proper
role of historical practice in the context of separation of powers”1 and to the
response that “[h]istorical practice is a slippery, unhelpfully capacious notion
masquerading as a mid-twentieth-century neutral principle.”2
Meanwhile, the history of constitutional law has also looked to the future.
Over decades, James Madison carefully revised his notes from the
Constitutional Convention with an eye to eventual public consumption.3 After
the Convention, Madison warned his new colleagues in Congress of the
importance of their constitutional debates: “The decision that is at this time
made will become the permanent exposition of the constitution; and on a
permanent exposition of the constitution will depend the genius and character
of the whole government.”4 He returned to these themes throughout his career,
ever attentive to how political practice would set a precedent for tomorrow’s
constitutional law.

1. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,

126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012).
2. Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77-78 (2013); see also

Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 674-75 (2016)
(calling “attention to a general, and surprising, lack of rigor in how historical branch
practice is used in separation of powers interpretation”).
3. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 179-240 (2015).
4. The Congressional Register, Minutes of the House of Representatives (June 17, 1789), in
11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 904, 921 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds.,
1992) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS] (statement of
Rep. Madison); see also The Daily Advertiser, Minutes of the House of Representatives
(June 17, 1789), in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS, supra, at 895, 895
(statement of Rep. Madison).
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This Article attempts to unite that past and present. It reconstructs James
Madison’s theory of postenactment historical practice, sometimes called
“liquidation,” as in: “All new laws . . . are considered as more or less obscure and
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications.”5 Liquidation was a specific way of
looking at post-Founding practice to settle constitutional disputes, and it can
be used today to make historical practice in constitutional law less slippery, less
capacious, and more precise.
The problems of how to reconcile text and precedent, of how to mediate
between fixation and contestation, of how to be an originalist in a fallen
world—none of these are new. And none of them were lost on Madison. His
articulation of liquidation over the course of his life can be seen as an attempt
to solve these problems—to explain the role of precedent in a system of text, to
allow stability without forfeiting constitutional faith, to allow constitutional
updating while adhering to original meaning.
This focus on Madison is expository and conceptual, not dictated either by
history or constitutional law. Madison was not the only one to use the specific
term liquidation, nor to avail himself of the general framework of settlement
through constitutional practice.6 And constitutional law, even on originalist
premises, is not limited to the views of James Madison. Rather, this Article
examines the concept of liquidation through Madison because Madison had an
unusually extensive, thorough, and systematic discussion of it. Having his
theory of it in hand will let us decide whether it is normatively desirable and
help us explore whether it was a widespread part of the law at the Founding,
issues this Article will also begin to sketch out. But before we can proceed to
those questions, we must know what liquidation is.
This Article presents that concept of liquidation. Part I discusses modern
attention to the concept. Part II breaks down the precise mechanics of
Madison’s concept of liquidation, synthesizing Madison’s thought over the
course of his career. Part III shows how liquidation is grounded in certain
widely shared constitutional values. Part IV then attempts to work out some
more detailed issues with liquidation on which Madison’s own views may
sometimes appear ambiguous or incomplete.
I.

Rediscovering Liquidation

Every time one turns around, a new law or official act is being assailed on
grounds of being “unprecedented.” Perhaps it is a new comprehensive health

5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
6. See infra Part II.D.
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care reform7 or the structure of a new independent agency.8 Perhaps it is the
Senate’s failure to confirm (or even vote on) a Supreme Court nominee.9
Perhaps it is the rumored possibility that the President might pardon himself.10
The charge is supposed to sound not just in political norms but in
constitutional law—to carry “a distinct whiff of impermissibility.”11
And on the other hand, in recent years longstanding practices have been
charged with constitutional invalidity. Look, for instance, at Congress’s
powers of contempt,12 the appointment of civil service officials,13 national
injunctions by the federal courts,14 the civil forfeiture of tainted assets,15 or the
designation of an “acting” cabinet official without Senate confirmation.16 Here,
too, history has sometimes been said to sustain these practices.

7. See generally JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO

OBAMACARE (2013).
8. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

16.

(Kavanaugh, J.) (calling the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
“unprecedented in our constitutional history”), rev’d in part en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
See Josh Chafetz, Essay, Unprecedented?: Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a
Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 108-09 (2017); see also Robin Bradley Kar & Jason
Mazzone, Essay, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say About
President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
ONLINE 53, 60-82 (2016) (arguing that opposition to the elevation of Chief Judge
Garland reflected “a major departure from more than two centuries of historical
tradition”).
See S.M., Can Donald Trump Pardon Himself?, ECONOMIST: DEMOCRACY IN AM. (July 25,
2017), https://perma.cc/7LFT-B3GD (referring to the notion as an “unprecedented
courtesy”).
Chafetz, supra note 9, at 96.
See, e.g., E. Garrett West, Revisiting Contempt of Congress 3-5 (June 25, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/QD58-HBBE.
See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443,
545-58 (2018) (discussing various civil service officials who are arguably appointed in
violation of the original meaning of the Constitution); see also Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (adopting Mascott’s analysis).
See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 417, 419-20 (2017).
Compare Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849-50 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari) (offering historical criticism of civil forfeiture practices), with
Caleb Nelson, Feature, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2456
(2016) (concluding that civil forfeiture laws “are consistent with the original meaning
of the Constitution as liquidated over time”).
See Designating an Acting Attorney Gen., 2018 WL 6131923 (Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Nov. 14, 2018); see also Will Baude, Who Is Lawfully the Attorney
General Right Now?, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 10, 2018, 3:48 PM),
https://perma.cc/P6VV-2GM2.
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But history, it has been wisely observed, is neither self-interpreting nor
self-enforcing.17 Rather, constructing precedents and principles out of
historical events requires a framework to tell us which events are relevant and
why.18 In the context of judicial precedent, such frameworks are ubiquitous,
widely taught, and widely studied. But what about the less familiar genre of
precedent and practice outside of the courts?
It turns out that at the Founding, there was such a framework, one
developed with remarkable depth and theoretical insight by none other than
James Madison: that of liquidation. The idea has made mysterious cameo
appearances in recent cases and scholarship, but without full explanation,
pedigree, or justification.
The U.S. Supreme Court reintroduced the concept a few years ago in its
opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning, which interpreted the Recess Appointments
Clause of the Constitution for the first time.19 The strongest arguments in the
case boiled down to a clash between apparent longstanding practice and
interpretive first principles such as original meaning and structure.20 The case
therefore became a battleground for recurring methodological questions:
When should the Court invalidate longstanding practices in the political
branches? Can subsequent practice trump the original meaning of the text?
Indeed, at oral argument Justice Scalia and Solicitor General Don Verrilli
sparred over this very point.21
While eventually finding the appointments invalid for other reasons, a
majority of the Court nonetheless sided with the authority of historical
practice over the challengers’ argument from text and original meaning.22

17. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 662-68 (1987).
18. See Chafetz, supra note 9, at 96, 130-31.
19. See 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President

shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the
Senate . . . .”).
20. Compare Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559-60, with id. at 2594-600 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment). As a matter of full disclosure, I coauthored an amicus brief on behalf of
myself and other constitutional law scholars arguing that the appointments at issue
were invalid on original meaning and other grounds. See Brief of Constitutional Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550
(No. 12-1281), 2013 WL 6213263.
21. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-8, Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (No. 12-1281), 2014
WL 111105.
22. The majority invalidated the appointments on the grounds that they happened during
brief three-day recesses between “pro forma sessions,” Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573-76,
and that these three-day recesses were presumptively too short to trigger the recess
appointment power, id. at 2566-67.
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“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of the government,’” the Court wrote, “can
inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’”23 It continued:
That principle is neither new nor controversial. As James Madison wrote, it “was
foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of
opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily used
in such a charter . . . and that it might require a regular course of practice to
liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.” And our cases have continually
confirmed Madison’s view.24

This passage marked the first time that this use of “liquidate” had appeared in
the body of a Supreme Court opinion.25
In this sense the Court was riding an early trend. “Liquidation” was also a
foreign word to most legal scholars until Caleb Nelson introduced it in an
article eighteen years ago.26 Since then, liquidation has been invoked
occasionally by a small corner of historical scholarship,27 but it basically
remains a piece of obscure jargon.
23. Id. at 2560 (first quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); and
24.

25.

26.

27.

then quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Letter from
James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908)). The Court cited nine such cases. See id. (citing
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689-90 (1929); Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118-19 (1925); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
472-74 (1915); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316; and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803)).
As usual, Justice Black was the unappreciated precursor. I have found one single
previous reference by the Supreme Court to liquidation: A footnote in Justice Black’s
opinion for the Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n cites Madison’s
use of the word in Federalist No. 37, and that footnote has attracted almost no attention.
See 322 U.S. 533, 550 n.33 (1944) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 193-94 (James
Madison) (rev. ed. 1901)).
See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1,
10-21 (2001) [hereinafter Nelson, Stare Decisis] (discussing both Madison and
antebellum case law). For more recent discussions, see Nelson, supra note 15, at 2452-53;
and Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-29
(2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Originalism]. For an important earlier discussion, see
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,
910, 940-41 (1985).
See, e.g., William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J.
1738, 1808-12 (2013); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1728-33 (2004); Michael McConnell,
Lecture, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1773-76 (2015);
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 142-46
(2016); Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1797, 1806-08. There is also a recent student note on the subject. See Paul G. Ream,
Note, Liquidation of Constitutional Meaning Through Use, 66 DUKE L.J. 1645 (2017).
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Yet as liquidation starts to creep into the legal lexicon, its
underdevelopment has begun to raise questions and challenges. Michael
Rappaport has called the permissibility of liquidation “a complicated question”
and “sometimes controversial.”28 Richard Fallon has observed that “the idea of
‘liquidation’ through practice—despite its Madisonian provenance—remains
obscure in some respects.”29 Aziz Huq has suggested that “neither Madison nor
other Framers were pellucid as to who would do this liquidating.”30 Curt
Bradley and Neil Siegel have stated that “Madison never presented a detailed
explanation of the idea, and it has received only limited attention in the
academic literature.”31 And Jack Rakove, writing about Madison’s discussion of
linguistic instability in Federalist No. 37, has declared that “much more work
needs to be done on the entire concept of political language as such.”32 In short,
liquidation has lacked any systematic exploration. This Article provides one.
II. Understanding Liquidation
So what was James Madison’s understanding of liquidation, and how did it
work? We now turn to these questions.
A. Groundwork
Madison expounded the idea of liquidation over the course of his long
political life. One of his earliest and most quoted discussions came in his essay
Federalist No. 37. Writing as “Publius,” Madison pled that “many allowances
ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the
undertaking referred to the Convention.”33 He went on: “All new laws, though
penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most
mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions
and adjudications.”34
28. Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing from the Original

Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 893 n.8 (2014).
29. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1774 (2015).
Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1663 n.362
(2014).
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and
Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29.
Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past: More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 975-76, 976 n.28 (2015).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 233; see id. at 239.
Id. at 236.
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There are two core ideas here. One is that legal texts, including the
Constitution, do not have a fully determined meaning. That idea would have
been familiar to readers of Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke
and Thomas Hobbes.35 The other, and perhaps Madison’s more important
contribution, was that these indeterminacies could and would be settled by
subsequent practice.36 Madison returned to and developed these ideas
repeatedly over time. While Federalist No. 37 may mark the beginning of
Madison’s discussion of liquidation,37 he continued to discuss and elaborate on
the concept over the course of his life—in public and private, in the abstract
and concretely.
In 1789, then-Representative Madison invoked the concept of settlement
by practice during congressional debates about the President’s power to
remove executive officers. As Congress began to create and structure the first
executive departments, it had to decide whether to make provision for the
tenure of the officers in those departments. It quickly became clear that there
were at least four competing positions about the scope of executive power, and
Congress had to choose from among them.38 Madison warned his colleagues
that their deliberations had constitutional consequences: Their decision would
stand as a “permanent exposition of the constitution,” and therefore must be
approached with great care.39
35. See, e.g., HANNAH DAWSON, LOCKE, LANGUAGE AND EARLY-MODERN PHILOSOPHY 210-38

36.
37.

38.

39.

(2007) (discussing Locke); GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 76-77 (2010) (discussing Hobbes);
Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public
Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 593-95 (2011) (discussing Locke).
Cf. MCDOWELL, supra note 35, at 75-76 (suggesting that Hobbes would be hostile to
customary law).
I have found one earlier reference by Madison to “settl[ing]” the “meaning” of a
provision of the Articles of Confederation, but without much detail. See James
Madison, Notes on Debates (1783), https://perma.cc/S4AE-FY44, reprinted in
6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 35 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal
eds., 1969). Citations to Madison’s letters and other writings are to the University of
Virginia’s Founders Early Access project. See Founders Early Access, ROTUNDA,
https://perma.cc/3WP6-V363 (archived Oct. 7, 2018). For a discussion of the
provenance of Founders Early Access documents, see Methodological Appendix below.
See Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27
COLUM. L. REV. 353, 361 (1927) (describing the four camps); see also Saikrishna Prakash,
New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1034-42 (2006) (same). There
is a historical debate about whether Congress in fact settled on only one of those four
possibilities or split between two candidates. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 284-85 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing for ambiguity), and Corwin, supra, at
360-69 (same), with Prakash, supra (arguing that Congress settled on an executive power
of removal).
See The Congressional Register, supra note 4, at 921 (statement of Rep. Madison);
The Daily Advertiser, supra note 4, at 895 (statement of Rep. Madison). For more on the
importance of this episode of constitutional interpretation, see Jonathan Gienapp,
footnote continued on next page
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Madison’s concern with the establishment of constitutional precedent
continued during subsequent legislative debates.40 He repeatedly intervened
when his colleagues were tempted to spend money for ends that Madison
thought sympathetic but beyond federal power. Warning them against
“establishing a dangerous precedent,”41 he took the lead in revising these bills
to bring them in line with his own view of the Constitution, and thus to avoid
allowing an incorrect meaning of the Constitution to be liquidated and settled
as precedent.42
But Madison’s most controversial invocation of the concept of liquidation
came later, after he assumed the presidency.43 In 1791, Representative Madison
had opposed the constitutionality of the first national bank, but it was
ultimately enacted over his objections and persisted for twenty years.44 In 1815
and 1816, now-President Madison was presented with bills chartering a new
bank. He concluded that his earlier constitutional doubts had now been
“precluded in my judgment by repeated recognitions under varied
circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by
indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the
nation.”45 He ultimately signed the new charter into law.46
Madison then continued to adhere to and explain these views even once he
was out of office and retired from government service.47 That was the context
in which he wrote to Judge Spencer Roane that constitutional indeterminacy

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.

46.
47.

Making Constitutional Meaning: The Removal Debate and the Birth of Constitutional
Essentialism, 35 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 375 (2015). See also NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES
OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN, PRESIDENT 264-67 (2017).
See infra Part II.C.
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1794).
See infra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
For a more extended discussion of liquidation and the national bank, see Part II.C.1
below.
See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954, 1960 (1791); see also Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 3, 1 Stat.
191, 192 (providing that the bank was to expire in 1811). There are two different
printings of the first two volumes of the Annals of Congress, with different pagination.
See William Baude & Jud Campbell, Early American Constitutional History: A Source
Guide 11-12 (Oct. 31, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/326P-Q9V7. All
citations in this Article are to the “History of Congress” printing.
James Madison, Veto Message (Jan. 30, 1815), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 555, 555 (James D. Richardson ed.,
Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1897) [hereinafter Madison 1815 Veto Message]; see
also 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189-91 (1815) (recording Madison’s veto message).
See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266.
Madison retired after completing his second presidential term in 1817. See
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-2005, H.R. DOC.
NO. 108-222, at 1488-89 (2005).
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“might require a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning”
of a given term,48 and wrote similar accounts to many others.49
And most notably, Madison continued to adhere to his stance on
liquidation and the bank even as the political winds began to change once
again. In 1832, President Jackson vetoed a bill rechartering the bank on the
grounds that it had been unconstitutional all along, thus vindicating
Representative Madison in 1791 as against President Madison in 1816.50 But
Madison did not treat this incident as vindication. He subsequently received a
letter from a group of folks in Ohio (“[t]he friends of free principles”) who
planned a banquet to celebrate the death of the bank (“the emancipation of
their country from the thraldom of the United States Bank”).51 Figuring him as
an “uncompromising enemy” of the unconstitutional bank, the group asked
him to be an honored guest at their public dinner, or at least to send along “an
appropriate sentiment to be given in your name.”52 Madison respectfully
declined, reminding them that even now, he retained his “convict[ion]
heretofore officially, and otherwise expressed, that in expounding the
Constitution, in the case of the Bank, the decision of the Nation had been
sufficiently manifested, to over-rule individual opinions,” even including his
own.53 Hence even when opposing the bank had become popular,54 Madison

48. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), https://perma.cc/5KHF

49.

50.

51.
52.
53.

54.

-6ZAL, reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 500, 502
(David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2009).
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Dec. 1831), https://perma.cc
/DD2Y-EWYS, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 471 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910); see also infra Part II.B (citing many of Madison’s writings). Indeed, in one of these
letters Madison repeated a formulation very similar to that in Federalist No. 37. See
Letter from James Madison to Thomas S. Grimke (Jan. 15, 1828), https://perma.cc
/5AY2-KZZQ, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 298, 299
(explaining that “new terms” are “always liable more or less till made technical by
practice, to discordant interpretations”).
See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra note 45, at 576, 576
[hereinafter Jackson 1832 Veto Message].
Letter from Moses Dawson and Others to James Madison (Feb. 1, 1836),
https://perma.cc/6DGW-BUUM.
Id.
Letter from James Madison to Moses Dawson and Others (Feb. 20, 1836),
https://perma.cc/H42C-55A6, reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 427, 427 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1865) [hereinafter LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON].
See generally Mark A. Graber, Antebellum Perspectives on Free Speech, 10 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 779, 807-08 (2002) (reviewing MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE
PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2000)) (noting the political opposition to the bank after 1828).
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did not return to his original, “individual opinion[].”55 Liquidation appears to
have been a principled stance for him, not purely political pragmatism.
The rest of this Part will develop Madison’s theory and apply it to these
incidents in somewhat greater detail. But first, one final note on terminology:
The word “liquidate” may seem like an odd term for this concept. Federalist
No. 37 suggests taking amorphous or unformed meanings and giving them
substance, structure, and boundaries.56 So why “liquidate” rather than
“solidify”?57
Etymologically, the term derives from the Latin word “liquidus” which
could mean—among other things—“clear” or “evident.”58 Since at least the
seventeenth century, “liquidate” has been used to mean “[t]o make clear or plain
(something obscure or confused); to render unambiguous; to settle (differences,
disputes).”59 Examples of its use include Bishop John Hacket’s description of
John Williams, the sometime Keeper of the Great Seal of England, as having
“discours’d with that depth of Learning, yet liquidating that depth with such
facility of opening it,”60 and Jeremy Bentham’s explanation that the “pains and
pleasures” of the afterlife “are matter only of expectation” and thus “altogether
unliquidated in point of quality.”61 So to “liquidate” the meaning of a term is to
“clarify” or “settle” it. This may also relate to other definitions that will be more
familiar to today’s financially minded scholars: “[t]o determine and apportion
by agreement or by litigation; to reduce to order, set out clearly (accounts)”62 or
“[t]o clear off, pay (a debt).”63
Whatever its origins, the term probably still sounds bizarre to modern
readers, but the bizarre may actually be more perspicuous than the familiar.
For instance, we could instead refer to “settlement” or “fixation” of meaning,
55. See Letter from James Madison to Moses Dawson and Others, supra note 53, at 427.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
57. Akhil Amar uses “clarified and concretized.” See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
58.

59.
60.
61.

62.
63.

UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 309 (2012).
See Liquidus, OXFORD REFERENCE: POCKET OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc
/D2BM-VKZB (archived Dec. 20, 2018) (defining “liquidus” as “liquid, fluid; clear;
manifest; smooth; melodious; evident”); see also Liquidate, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
https://perma.cc/N56H-U4KQ (archived Dec. 20, 2018) (noting the Latin origins of the
word).
See Liquidate, supra note 58 (definition 1.a).
JOHN HACKET, SCRINIA RESERATA: A MEMORIAL OFFER’D TO THE GREAT DESERVINGS OF
JOHN WILLIAMS, D.D. 19 (London, Edw. Jones 1692).
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
27 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789). Probably coincidentally, Hacket was also talking
about a discourse on the afterlife. See HACKET, supra note 60, at 19.
Liquidate, supra note 58 (definition 2).
Id. (definition 3).

12

Constitutional Liquidation
71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019)

but it would be less clear that we were referring specifically to a technical
Founding-era concept because those terms are widely used today for other
interpretive concepts.64 As was said of a different coinage, the archaism of
“liquidation” makes it “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers.”65
B. Theory
So how exactly does liquidation work? The concept is spread throughout
various passages of Madison’s writing, especially letters he wrote late in the
course of his career explaining his own constitutional views. It is never quite
systematically explained in a single place.
Many observers of Madison have suggested that he changed his
constitutional views over time, or that his actions in office did not reflect a
consistent constitutional theory.66 But that inference is not necessary and may
not be right. Three key features of liquidation recur throughout Madison’s
writings, and taken together, they do mark a generally coherent theory, one
that traces a steady path from Federalist No. 37 to his twilight at Montpelier.
Whatever Madison’s true motivations were, the point is that we can charitably
reconstruct his theory of liquidation in a way that demonstrates great
constitutional logic.67
That logic centered around three things: an indeterminacy, a course of
deliberate practice, and settlement.
1.

Indeterminacy

The first premise of liquidation is an indeterminacy in the meaning of the
Constitution. If first-order interpretive principles make the meaning clear in a
64. See, e.g., RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017);

Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015).
65. Cf. 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 276-77 (Charles Hartshorne &
Paul Weiss eds., 1934) (coining “pragmaticism”).
66. See, e.g., Ream, supra note 27, at 1657 (suggesting a “shift” and an “important evolution”
in Madison’s thinking); see also id. at 1648 (“Madison changed his views on what
liquidation might entail . . . .”).
67. There is a longstanding historical debate about whether “Madison’s thinking
fundamentally changed in the decades after ratification” or whether it was marked by
“continuity.” See Jonathan Gienapp, How to Maintain a Constitution: The Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions and James Madison’s Struggle with the Problem of Constitutional
Maintenance, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
53, 55 n.6 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2016) (citing many sources). I do not take a position on
the historical question, except to the point of emphasizing that there is an
understanding of liquidation that is consistent with continuity from the Founding
onward.
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given context, there is no need to resort to liquidation. This is the beginning of
Federalist No. 37’s discussion of liquidation, which stresses that liquidation is
necessary when and because a new legal provision is “more or less obscure and
equivocal.”68
Similarly, Madison repeatedly described liquidation as needed because
“difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise, in expounding
terms and phrases necessarily used in [the Constitution]”69 and as arising in
cases of “doubtful or contested meanings.”70
What kind of indeterminacy? Modern technical vocabulary distinguishes
between two kinds of indeterminacy: ambiguity and vagueness.71 A term is
ambiguous if “it has more than one sense,” like the word “cool,” which can
mean either “low temperature” or “stylish.”72 A term is vague if it has one sense
with borderline cases, like the word “tall,” which leaves us with no precise
number to differentiate those who are tall from those who are not.73 One
might imagine liquidation extending only to one of these kinds of
indeterminacy,74 but it seems that liquidation extended to both ambiguity and
vagueness. Indeed, we might even equate Madison’s “equivocal”75 to
“ambiguous” and his “obscure”76 to “vague.”
Madison included vagueness when he wrote that “[a]ll new laws” have a
certain degree of indeterminacy.77 Even if the law has a clear core, which it
often does, there will always be edge cases. (This also means that a
constitutional provision is not categorically clear or indeterminate in the
abstract; it depends on the question.) For example, it might be very clear that
Congress has the power to build lighthouses, but less clear whether it can

68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 236.
69. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 502.
70. Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut (May 1830), https://perma.cc/X5D7

-LH72, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 370, 372.
71. See Lawrence B. Solum, Essay, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

COMMENT. 95, 97-98 (2010); see also Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive
Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1534-35 (2014) (explaining this
distinction).
Solum, supra note 71, at 97.
See id. at 98.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (“Professor Nelson’s proposal that initial
practice can provide a precedent to fix original meaning that was indeterminate when
enacted is more plausible when dealing with ambiguity than vagueness.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 236.
Id.
Id.
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create a university or finance a voyage to Baffin’s Bay.78 Federalist No. 37 thus
anticipated what we might now call open texture—the idea that “[n]othing can
eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt,” which
“imparts to all rules a fringe of vagueness or ‘open texture.’”79
Madison also included ambiguity, most plainly in his essay Helvidius
Number II, where he discussed the possibility of ambiguity in separation of
powers disputes, an ambiguity that “supposes the constitution to have given
the power to one department only; and the doubt to be to which it has been
given.”80 He similarly described “the exposition of the Constitution” as a way to
settle which of “[f]our constructive doctrines” was the best account of the
power to remove federal officers.81 These are both descriptions of ambiguity,
not vagueness.
Madison also suggested that such indeterminacies were particularly likely
in the Constitution’s federalism provisions—“those which divide legislation
between the General and local Governments.”82 Of course that includes the
debate over the constitutionality of a national bank, which was foremost a
debate about the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, and hence a debate
about federalism. And indeed, the bank debates are what prompted many of
Madison’s comments about liquidation.
The indeterminacy premise also implies that there are limits to the domain
of liquidation. Not everything is up for grabs. Madison thus repeatedly said
that while the Constitution could be “expounded,” it could “not [be] controuled
or varied by the subordinate authority of a legislature.”83 He criticized the
“fallacy . . . in confounding a question whether precedents could expound a
78. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-

1801, at 69-72 (1997).
79. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (3d ed. 2012). For further discussion of open

80.

81.

82.
83.

texture, see Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1109, 1124-29, 1126 n.62 (2008); and Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as
Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1120-22, 1121 n.20 (2015).
See James Madison, Helvidius Number II (1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF
1793-1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 65, 68-69 (Morton J.
Frisch ed., 2007).
See Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), https://perma.cc
/KL9R-FPX3, reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 249, 250 (Charles F.
Hobson et al. eds., 1979)); see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing
the congressional debate on this subject). But see Gienapp, supra note 39, at 392 (arguing
that the participants in the removal debates “did not think that they were operating in
a ‘construction zone,’ nor did they think that they were in that zone only because
constitutional meaning had proved indeterminate”).
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 502.
Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), https://perma.cc
/6ZNT-BY5C, reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 53, at 183, 184.
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Constitution, with a question whether they could alter a Constitution.”84
Similarly, despite licensing the settlement of indeterminacy by practice,
Madison condemned “constructive innovations”85 of the Constitution or
“expounding it with a laxity, which may vary its essential character.”86
Liquidation was permissible within the extent of indeterminacy, but not
beyond.
2.

Course of deliberate practice

Once a constitutional provision was found indeterminate, practice could
fill the gap in meaning. But it was not enough that there be a single act in the
face of indeterminacy, which would make the Constitution effectively
unconstraining whenever it was ambiguous. Rather, Madison repeatedly wrote
that there must be a “course” of practice.
What defined such a course? Madison used many similar formulations: a
“regular course of practice”;87 a “course of practice of sufficient uniformity and
duration”;88 a “continued course of practical sanctions”;89 “reiterated sanctions . . .
thro’ a long period of time”;90 a “settled practice, enlightened by occurring
cases”;91 a “course of authoritative, deliberate and continued decisions”;92 or a
“course of authoritative expositions sufficiently deliberate, uniform, and
settled.”93
Sometimes his descriptions of an example of liquidation were even more
emphatic: “that which has the uniform sanction of successive Legislative
bodies, through a period of years and under the varied ascendancy of parties”;94
84. Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
85. Letter from James Madison to John G. Jackson (Dec. 28, 1821), https://perma.cc/LT6Q

86.
87.
88.
89.

90.

91.
92.
93.

94.

-Z4UG, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 441, 442
(David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2013).
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 503.
Id. at 502.
Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 70, at 372.
Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman (Jan. 6, 1831), https://perma.cc
/V6GZ-RULY, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 429,
434.
Letter from James Madison to Lafayette (Nov. 1826), https://perma.cc/C5ZE-GKKD,
reprinted in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 53, at 538,
542.
Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman, supra note 89, at 434.
Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), https://perma.cc
/UR6T-W4YV, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 442,
443.
Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 186.
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“reiterated and deliberate sanctions of every branch of the Govt: to all which
had been superadded many positive concurrencies of the State Govts and
implied ones by the people at large”;95 or “the uniform & practical sanction
given . . . by every . . . Branch of the Genl. Govt. for nearly 40 years; with a
concurrence or acquiescence of every State Govt. in all its Branches,
throughout the same period; and it may be added thro’ all the vicissitudes of
party, which marked the period.”96 You get the idea: A practice had to happen
repeatedly and consistently—to be neither a one-off nor a continually
contested question.
And it was not enough for Madison that the practice be one of sheer
political will; it must also be one of constitutional interpretation. For instance,
in a letter explaining why the course of practice in favor of the bank’s
constitutionality had not been “broken by the negative on a Bank bill” in
1811,97 Madison explained that the outcome in that case (a split Senate leading
to a tiebreaking vote against the bank by Vice President George Clinton)98 was
the result of a Union of a number of members who objected to the expediency
only of the Bill, with those wh[o] opposed it on constitutional grounds. On a
naked question of Constitutionality, it was understood that there would have
been a majority who made no objection on that score.99

Similarly, Madison specified that the practice must be “deliberate”100 or the
result of “a subject of solemn discussion in Congress.”101 In an extended analogy
between judicial precedent and liquidation (there called “legislative
precedents”), Madison described judicial precedents as binding “when formed
on due discussion and consideration,” being “an exposition of the law publicly
made” and “deliberately sanctioned by reviews and repetitions,” and argued that
95. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), https://perma.cc/5ZQP

96.

97.

98.
99.

100.
101.

-9DK8, reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES, supra note 48,
at 190, 190-91.
Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 18, 1828), https://perma.cc/NR59
-VRJU, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 316, 333; see
also id. at 334 (describing as a “sound and safe test” of the Constitution’s meaning a
“uniform interpretation by all the successive authorities under it, commencing with its
birth, and continued for a long period, thro’ the varied state of political contests”).
See Letter from James Madison to George McDuffie (May 8, 1830), https://perma.cc
/PN4B-MGL5, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 364,
365.
See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
Letter from James Madison to George McDuffie, supra note 97, at 365 (alteration in
original); see also Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at
187 (“On a simple question of constitutionality, there was a decided majority in favor of
it.”).
Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes, supra note 93, at 443; Letter from
James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 95, at 190.
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legislative precedents were analogous.102 Thus, he said elsewhere, “Legislative
precedents” were “entitled to little respect” when they were “without full
examination & deliberation.”103 As we will see, the next question was whether
that deliberation had spanned the branches or otherwise resolved individual
disagreements.
3.

Settlement

Closely related to the idea of a course of deliberate practice was the
question of when that practice had really stuck—what differentiated an ongoing
constitutional controversy from one that had become liquidated.
Under Madison’s view, the course of deliberate practice became a binding
one only once it culminated in some kind of settlement. That is why Madison
sometimes described such practices as reaching “sufficient uniformity”104 or
being “settled.”105 So long as the practice was an ongoing battle between two
competing interpretations, even if one had the upper hand in reality, that did
not mean that the course of practice had become binding. Rather, liquidation
only occurred when that practice took a particular form, one that justified
calling an end to the dispute and “overruling individual judgments”106 or
containing “an authority sufficient to overrule individual constructions.”107
This kind of authority had two elements: acquiescence and public sanction.
Acquiescence: The key idea of acquiescence was that the losers in some sense
gave up.108 This might mean bipartisan acceptance. For instance, Madison
described the requisite practice as “that which has the uniform sanction of
successive Legislative bodies, through a period of years and under the varied

102. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 183-84.
103. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), https://perma.cc/96ES

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

-VULG, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES, supra
note 85, at 317, 320.
Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 70, at 372.
Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman, supra note 89, at 434.
Letter from James Madison to George McDuffie, supra note 97, at 365.
Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman, supra note 89, at 434.
See Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, The Louisiana Purchase,
and Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803-1898, at
83, 99-103 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005) (“The
constitutional status of Texas was settled when opponents of annexation abandoned
the fight.”). This idea has also been harnessed by Bruce Ackerman, see BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 288-90 (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 19-21 (1998)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS], though his theory differs in important
respects from liquidation, see infra text accompanying notes 396-99.
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ascendancy of parties.”109 Or it might be institutional. For instance, we might
look for whether other branches had acquiesced in a particular branch’s
interpretation, as opposed to that branch simply reasserting its own contested
views. The strongest cases of acquiescence appeared to combine the two.
Madison discussed practices that had adhered “under every administration
preceding mine, with the general concurrence of the State authorities,”110 or
that had been followed “by every . . . Branch of the Genl. Govt.,” by “every State
Govt. in all its Branches,” and “thro’ all the vicissitudes of party.”111
Either way, acquiescence distinguishes between sheer assertion and
working agreement. Note that this means that liquidation ultimately depends
on what is settled, not on what ought to be settled. Even if one thinks that one
side has the better argument about a constitutional ambiguity, the question is
not yet liquidated if both sides continue to stick to their guns, however
unreasonably. The mechanics of liquidation thus track the actual amount of
polarization among parties and institutions.
Public sanction: This brings us to the second aspect of settlement: Madison
also described it as something that involved not just government officials but
the public, too. A liquidated practice would “carry with it the public
sanction.”112 It would reflect “the acquiescence of the people at large”113 or
“evidence of the Public Will.”114 Or as Madison put it in declining to celebrate
the death of the national bank: “[T]he decision of the Nation had been sufficiently
manifested, to over-rule individual opinions, and to sanction the power
exercised, in establishing such an institution . . . .”115
Madison traced this requirement back to the principles of popular
sovereignty that animated the Constitution in the first place: Liquidation
109. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 186 (emphasis

added).
110. See Letter from James Madison to Lafayette, supra note 90, at 542.
111. Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell, supra note 96, at 333. While parts of

112.
113.
114.
115.

these passages were omitted from some published collections of Madison’s letters, they
are visible in the original manuscript in the Library of Congress. See James Madison to
Joseph C. Cabell, September 18, 1828., LIBR. CONGRESS, https://perma.cc/4HYM-4TLR
(archived Oct. 5, 2018). For an explanation of the different versions of Madison’s letters,
see Methodological Appendix below.
Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 70, at 372.
Letter from James Madison to Lafayette, supra note 90, at 542.
Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes, supra note 93, at 443.
Letter from James Madison to Moses Dawson and Others, supra note 53, at 427
(emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes 50-53; see also Letter from James
Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477 (“[I]n the case of a Constitution as of a
law a course of authoritative, deliberate and continued decisions, such as the Bank
could plead, was an evidence of the public judgment, necessarily superseding individual
opinions.”).
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required “solemnities & repetitions, sufficient to imply a concurrence of the
judgment & the will of those who having granted the power have the ultimate
right to explain the grant.”116 A liquidated practice was “a construction put on
the Constitution by the Nation, which having made it had the supreme right to
declare its meaning.”117 In other words, the people’s role as the ultimate source
of binding constitutional norms made them the ultimate source of
constructing its meaning as well. (Though, to be sure, this expression of
popular sovereignty was presumably lesser in stature than the formal
enactment of constitutional text, which is why it could “expound” but not
“alter.”)118
These two principles—official acquiescence and public sanction—were
intertwined. As Larry Kramer has argued, the “first principle of republicanism,
as Madison understood it,” was that public opinion “not only would, but should
control the course of government”—but only once it had been “settled” and
“fixed.”119 Madison saw the constitutional structure as a way to harness this
republican principle. Federalism and the separation of powers resulted in a
multiplicity of governments and branches, all (but the judiciary) ultimately
accountable to the people.120 Each group of officials would respond to the
actions of the others in part by appealing to the people, whose judgment was
ultimately the most important. “And in this way, separation of powers and
federalism became instrumentalities for generating a robust public discussion,
initiated and led by political leaders acting for their own reasons, through
which the ‘reason of the society’ could be developed and ‘the people themselves’
retain control.”121
This account of Madison’s republicanism explains why liquidation might
ultimately look to public sanction. On Madison’s model, the people had already
provided a set of direct rules for governance in the clear text of the
Constitution, which had been ratified by the people and therefore remained
binding until they altered or amended it. Interstitial interpretations or
questions left unresolved by the text could be answered by any officer into

Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 103, at 320.
Letter from James Madison to Lafayette, supra note 90, at 542.
See Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
Larry D. Kramer, Lecture, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 717-18
(2006).
120. See id. at 734-35; see also Josh Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of
Powers, 120 YALE L.J. 1084, 1122-28 (2011) (reviewing ALISON L. LACROIX, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010)).
121. Kramer, supra note 119, at 737.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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whose jurisdiction they fell.122 But those answers would become binding
constitutional law—that is, would become liquidated—only once indirectly
endorsed by the people who had the authority to promulgate binding
constitutional norms in the first place. And because the popular endorsement
was indirect and mediated, it was logical to treat it as a mere construction of
the document, rather than an amendment.
C. Examining Examples
As sketched above, Madison implemented the principles of liquidation
throughout his public life, most thoroughly in debates over the
constitutionality of the national bank,123 and also in congressional debates over
federal spending.
1.

The bank

Madison’s participation in the constitutional controversy over the bank
spanned three phases: his time in Congress, his presidency, and his
correspondence in retirement.
Madison first confronted the bank problem in 1791, when as a
representative in Congress he opposed the constitutionality of the first bill to
charter it.124 The constitutionality of the bank ultimately turned on whether it
was “necessary and proper” to Congress’s powers to tax and borrow money.125
Madison thought not: To satisfy the Constitution, the bank must be both
“necessary to the end, and incident to the nature” of the underlying enumerated

122. See Letter from James Madison to Unknown Recipient (Dec. 1834), https://perma.cc

/JP5S-RNGA, reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 53, at 349, 349 (“As the Legislative, Executive & Judicial Departments of the U.S.
are co-ordinate, and each equally bound to support the Constitution, it follows that
each must in the exercise of its functions, be guided by the text of the Constitution
according to its own interpretation of it . . . .”).
123. For a succinct summary, see Richard S. Arnold, Madison Lecture, How James Madison
Interpreted the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 286-90 (1997) (calling the bank
controversy “[t]he most famous instance of Madison’s use of the concept of precedent”).
For an even more succinct one, see Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 26, at 12 n.33.
124. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1894-902 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
125. See id. at 1896-98; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress the power to “lay
and collect Taxes”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (giving Congress the power to “borrow Money”);
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”).
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powers, and the bank was neither.126 He thought it depended on too tenuous a
string of “remote” “implications” “linked together” and that the creation of a
corporation was a “great and important power” which could not be implied or
incidental.127
But Madison lost that debate, and the bank bill passed.128 The
constitutional question was meanwhile considered by President Washington,
who was told that it was unconstitutional first by Attorney General Edmund
Randolph and then by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson as well.129
Washington turned to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton for a third
opinion.130 After receiving Hamilton’s defense of the bank, Washington
ultimately concluded that it was constitutional and signed the bill.131
After the bank bill was enacted, Congress repeatedly passed other statutes
that effectively reinforced its constitutionality.132 But the bank’s charter was
due to expire in 1811,133 and by 1808, rumblings had begun about renewing the
bank.134 Thus began the second phase: James Madison was now President,

126. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1898-901 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
127. See id. at 1899-900. For more on the latter point, see Baude, supra note 27, at 1749-55

128.
129.

130.
131.

132.

133.
134.

(arguing that some powers are so “great” that if not granted explicitly by the
Constitution, they ought not be implied). But see Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of
Congressional Power, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2016) (criticizing this theory).
See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954, 1960 (1791).
See Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Feb. 12, 1791), in
LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES:
INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 86, 89 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A.
Hall eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE BANK];
Opinion of Thomas Jefferson, Sec’y of State (Feb. 15, 1791), in HISTORY OF THE BANK,
supra, at 91, 91.
See Opinion of Alexander Hamilton on the Constitutionality of a National Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 129, at 95.
See S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 3d Sess. 282 (1791); Letter from George Washington to
Alexander Hamilton (Feb. 23, 1791), https://perma.cc/24F5-USLZ, reprinted in
7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 452 (Dorothy Twohig ed.,
1998) (recounting Washington’s discussions with Hamilton); see also Act of Feb. 25,
1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191.
See HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 129, at 114 (collecting “supplementary act[s]”
relating to the bank that were passed by Congress between 1791 and 1807); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Veto!: The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 205,
217-18 (1999) (noting that the “statutes authorizing the bank and bank-related matters”
served as “‘repeated recognitions’ of the bank’s constitutionality”).
See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, § 3, 1 Stat. at 192.
See HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 129, at 115 (recounting the presentation in both
the House and the Senate of the “memorial of the stockholders of the Bank of the
United States, praying a renewal of their charter”).
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giving opponents of the bank a friend in high places. In 1811, an attempt to
renew the bank failed in the Senate when Vice President Clinton cast the
tiebreaking vote against it.135
After financial troubles arising out of the War of 1812, Congress tried
again, passing a new bank bill in 1815.136 President Madison himself vetoed this
one,137 but the veto’s reasoning is illuminating. When Madison had fought the
bank in 1791, he had stressed both policy arguments and constitutional
arguments.138 In the message accompanying his 1815 veto, however, he
explained that he was relying only on policy arguments. Why? Because of
liquidation. As Madison put it, he was
[w]aiving the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to
establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by repeated
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government,
accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general
will of the nation.139

In other words, the bank’s constitutionality had been liquidated by the
previous course of practice.140 And lest one think that the veto statement was
cheap talk—a sort of departmentalist dictum, since Madison nonetheless

135. See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 329, 346-47 (1811). Then-Chief Judge Richard Arnold has

136.

137.
138.

139.
140.

mistakenly said that it was “Madison’s Vice President, Elbridge Gerry,” who cast the
deciding vote, see Arnold, supra note 123, at 287, but Gerry didn’t take office until 1813,
after Clinton’s death in 1812, see BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, 1774-2005, H.R. DOC. NO. 108-222, at 840 (2005) (Clinton); id. at 1113 (Gerry).
See 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 173, 176-77 (1815) (passage in the Senate); id. at 1043-45 (in the
House); see also BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 227-31 (1957) (discussing the financial difficulties
facing the United States between 1811 and 1815 and the concomitant desire for a
national bank).
See Madison 1815 Veto Message, supra note 45; see also 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189-91
(1815) (recording Madison’s veto message).
See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1894-96 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison) (elaborating on the
“principal disadvantages” of the bank); id. at 1896-902 (making the constitutional
argument).
Madison 1815 Veto Message, supra note 45, at 555; see also 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189
(1815).
For an external perspective, see EDWARD MCNALL BURNS, JAMES MADISON:
PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 133-34 (reprt. 1968) (“It is of course possible that the
vital need for a Bank to rescue the country from the financial chaos of the War of 1812
aided [Madison] in making this discovery.”).
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vetoed the bill—Madison made good on his constitutional views a year later. In
1816 Congress passed a new bill at Madison’s encouragement141 and he duly
signed it,142 further solidifying the constitutional settlement.
When the bank’s constitutionality was finally tested in the Supreme Court
a few years later, that constitutional settlement framed the Court’s decision. In
his opinion for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall
began by announcing that “this can scarcely be considered as an open
question.”143 He noted that the constitutionality of the bank had “been
recognised by many successive legislatures,” and that “[a]n exposition of the
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which
an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly
disregarded.”144
In this opening passage, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion also hit the key
elements of liquidation: indeterminacy, deliberation, and settlement.
Indeterminacy: Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that such liquidation
would not be dispositive if the unconstitutionality were clear (“a bold and
daring usurpation”), but “a doubtful question, one on which human reason may
pause,” could be “put at rest by the practice of the government” or at least
“ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice.”145
Deliberation: The question “did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature,
and pass unobserved. Its principle was completely understood, and was
opposed with equal zeal and ability.”146
Settlement: After extensive constitutional resistance, Chief Justice Marshall
explained, the bill had gotten both Washington’s constitutional approval

141. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 280-81 (1816) (passage in the Senate); id. at 1337, 1344 (in the

House); James Madison, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1815), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
supra note 45, at 562, 564-66
(noting “the embarrassments arising from the want of an uniform national currency”
and suggesting that if state banks are inadequate, “the probable operation of a national
bank will merit consideration”); see also 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 494 (1816) (reporting bank
bill from committee to respond to “that part of the President’s Message which relates to
an Uniform National Currency”).
See H.R. JOURNAL, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 627-28 (1816) (recording that the President had
signed the bank bill); see also Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
Id.
Id. Chief Justice Marshall also noted that the decision was one “of which the great
principles of liberty are not concerned,” but rather one in which “the respective powers
of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted.” Id. For a
discussion of liquidation of individual rights provisions, see Part IV.A below.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897,

142.
143.
144.
145.

146.
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(“minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast”)147 and had decades
later earned Madison’s constitutional acquiescence (“those who were most
prejudiced against the measure of its necessity”).148
The third phase was Madison’s retirement. In the years after McCulloch,
Madison continued to discuss the bank’s constitutionality in terms of
liquidation. (Indeed, the bulk of his writing on this topic seems to have been
about the bank.) Madison continued to defend his views as a matter of
interpretive principle. Just as he had implied in 1815,149 he maintained that his
views were a result of a consistent principle of liquidation. His “abstract
opinion of the text of the Constitution is not changed,” he explained, but his
“assent was given in pursuance of my early and unchanged opinion, that . . . a
course of authoritative expositions sufficiently deliberate, uniform, and settled,
was an evidence of the Public Will necessarily overruling individual
opinions.”150
And indeed, the elements of liquidation seem to have been met not only
from Chief Justice Marshall’s point of view, but even from Madison’s more
skeptical point of view. First, the question was indeterminate. Madison had
argued that the creation of the bank exceeded the implied powers reflected by
the Necessary and Proper Clause,151 but the principles he sketched out
necessarily left quite a bit to constitutional construction.152 Indeed, for all of
Madison’s forceful condemnation of the bank in his 1791 speech in Congress,
he also seemed to admit that the question was sufficiently indeterminate as to
require such construction. He noted that “[t]he doctrine of implication is always
a tender one.”153 And he invoked canons of construction for “doubtful” and
“controverted” cases.154
147. Id.; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 754-55 (1999)

148.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

(suggesting that this remark contains “traces of ethical argument” and that Chief Justice
Marshall was hinting that to contest the bank’s constitutionality “three decades later . . .
[would be] to stain the name of our First Man—to be, if not unAmerican, at least
unWashingtonian”).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402; see also Kurt T. Lash, Essay, Federalism, Individual
Rights, and Judicial Engagement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 882 n.56 (2012) (suggesting
that by this remark Chief Justice Marshall “had also implied that Madison, when
President, had changed his mind about the constitutionality of the Bank”).
See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes, supra note 93, at 442-43.
See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
See Baude, supra note 27, at 1808-10.
2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1899 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
See id. at 1896; see also LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON
AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 331 (1995) (“[I]t was apparent that the
Constitution was unclear; and careful reading of his speech of February 2 shows that
Madison was quite aware that neither strict nor broad construction of its language . . .
footnote continued on next page
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Second, Madison thought the bank’s constitutionality was supported by a
course of practice. As he put it in one of the many letters:
The Act originally establishing a Bank had undergone ample discussions in its
passage thro’ the several branches of the Government: It had been carried into
execution throughout a period of 20 years with annual legislative recognitions; in
one instance indeed, with a positive ramification of it into a new State . . . .155

To satisfy Madison’s conception of liquidation, that course of practice had
to have ultimately resulted in settlement—acquiescence and public sanction.
But the question of settlement is tricky: When exactly did it occur? By the late
1820s it is easy to see why Madison would have thought there was adequate
acquiescence—by then the Supreme Court had upheld the bank against state
onslaughts in both McCulloch v. Maryland156 and Osborn v. Bank of the United
States.157 And before that, Madison’s decision to sign the 1816 bank renewal bill
was a crucial moment of acquiescence—one of the bank’s earliest and ablest
opponents had publicly thrown in the towel.
But the trickier question is why Madison had thought there was an
adequately settled course of practice as early as 1815 or 1816. Surely Madison’s
own decision to acquiesce can’t be self-justifying. And what about that 1811
vote, where, as Madison acknowledged, his own158 Vice President had stopped

155.
156.
157.
158.

was actually—much less inherently—correct.”); Lee J. Strang, An Evaluation of Historical
Evidence for Constitutional Construction from the First Congress’ Debate over the
Constitutionality of the First Bank of the United States, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 193, 205 (2018)
(arguing that participants in the bank debate, including Madison, (1) “appeared to
believe that the Constitution’s meaning did not clearly answer the constitutional
question”; and (2) “appeared to believe that, after application of sufficient interpretative
argumentation, the Constitution’s meaning did answer the question”). But see Bradley &
Siegel, supra note 31, at 36 (“Madison, however, did not believe that the meaning of the
Constitution was ambiguous with respect to the permissibility of the national bank.”).
Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 186.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
In his June 1831 letter to Charles Ingersoll, Madison seemed to distance himself from
Clinton, referring to him as if he were a legislator, not part of the Madison
Administration. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at
187 (“[A]s to the negative of the Senate by the casting vote of the presiding
Officer; . . . .”). Perhaps that was right; an expert on the vice presidency writes that “[t]he
Constitution’s original meaning conceived of the Vice President, although perhaps not
a member of Congress, as occupying essentially a legislative position,” and that “[e]arly
leaders embraced this vision of the Vice President primarily as a legislative figure.”
Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice Presidency, 16 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 369, 386, 389 (2013) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 391-92 (“Senator John
Quincy Adams observed that ‘the only duty of a Vice president, under our
Constitution, is to preside in Senate’; he thought it anomalous that George Clinton, the
fourth Vice President, had been chosen for that position without any regard to his
ability to fulfill that function.” (quoting 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 385
(Charles Frances Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874))).
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the bank in the Senate, “the vote being expressly given on the ground of
unconstitutionality”?159 Indeed, when casting the tiebreaking vote in 1811 Vice
President Clinton had reprised objections that sounded just like thenRepresentative Madison’s original ones in 1791.160
Well, Madison explained:
[A]s to the negative of the Senate by the casting vote of the presiding Officer; it is a
fact well understood at the time that it resulted not from an equality of opinions
in that Assembly on the power of Congress to establish a Bank, but from a
junction of those who admitted the power but disapproved the plan, with those
who denied the power. On a simple question of constitutionality, there was a
decided majority in favor of it.161

I do not know whether Madison’s reconstruction of what was “well
understood” during the 1811 proceedings was in fact accurate. But if it was, it
was plausible for him to have regarded the controversy as liquidated. (And even
if it was incorrect, by the time he was writing in 1830 or 1831, the point may
have been moot.)
To be sure, constitutional opinion in favor of the bank was never
completely universal,162 and as it turns out, Madison’s acquiescence was not the
final chapter written during his lifetime. In 1832, after Madison had written
most of his letters on liquidation and the bank’s constitutionality, President
Jackson was presented with a bill to modify and continue the Second Bank of
the United States.163 President Jackson, unlike President Madison, vetoed his

159. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 186-87.
160. Compare 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 346 (1811) (“[T]he means must be suited and subordinate

to the end. The power to create corporations is not expressly granted; it is a high
attribute of sovereignty and in its nature not accessorial or derivative by implication,
but primary and independent.”), with 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1898 (1791) (statement of Rep.
Madison) (“[The Necessary and Proper Clause’s] meaning must . . . be limited to means
necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers.”), and id. at
1900 (“[T]he power of incorporation exercised in the bill . . . could never be deemed an
accessory or subaltern power, to be deduced by implication, as a means of executing
another power; it was in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive
prerogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution, could never have been
meant to be included in it . . . .”).
161. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 187; see also Letter
from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes, supra note 93, at 443 (“[I]t is believed to be
quite certain, that the equality of votes which referred the question to his casting vote,
was occasioned by a union of some who disapproved the plan of the Bank only, with
those who denied its Constitutionality; and that on a naked question of
Constitutionality, a majority of the Senate would have added another sanction, as at a
later period was done, to the validity of such an Institution.”).
162. See Chafetz, supra note 120, at 1105-07 (describing the continuation of the debate even
after McCulloch).
163. See 8 REG. DEB. 1073-74 (1832) (passage in the Senate); id. at 3851-52 (in the House).
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bank bill on constitutional grounds.164 By this time, of course, the Supreme
Court had held in McCulloch that the bank was constitutional, but Jackson did
not care. In a much-repeated departmentalist cri de coeur, he said: “The
Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its
own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to
support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it,
and not as it is understood by others.”165 And anyway, he added, McCulloch’s
reasoning was distinguishable.166
Jackson also had a few words about liquidation. “Mere precedent is a
dangerous source of authority,” he warned, referring to precedent in a
capacious sense, not limited to judicial decisions.167 Past practice therefore
“should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except
where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well
settled.”168 That exception, of course, sounded in one of the key elements of
liquidation.
Jackson then went on to argue that the bank’s constitutionality was far
from being liquidated:
One Congress, in 1791, decided in favor of a bank; another, in 1811, decided
against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a bank; another, in 1816, decided
in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the precedents drawn from
that source were equal. If we resort to the States, the expressions of legislative,
judicial, and executive opinions against the bank have been probably to those in
its favor as 4 to 1. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authority
were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me.169

Jackson read the evidence differently from Madison (who, recall, had a
different view of what had actually happened in 1811170), and he also changed
the denominator by emphasizing the role of the states in liquidation. But it is
striking that he gave any nod to liquidation’s elements even as he went on to
emphasize the irrelevance of judicial decisions.
Jackson’s veto is a reminder that whatever liquidation’s normative force, it
may not always succeed at building an unshakable consensus.171 Larry Kramer
164. See Jackson 1832 Veto Message, supra note 50, at 576.
165. Id. at 582.
166. See id. (“But in the case relied upon the Supreme Court have not decided that all the

features of this corporation are compatible with the Constitution.”).
167. Id. at 581; see id. (“It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality

168.
169.
170.
171.

in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of
the Supreme Court.” (emphasis added)).
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 582.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
For further discussion, see Part IV.C below.
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has also suggested that this episode modified Madison’s thinking on
interpretation, pushing him away from departmentalism and toward judicial
supremacy, at least for questions of federalism.172 Kramer discusses a long
public letter Madison wrote to Edward Everett in 1830 emphasizing the
Supreme Court’s role in ensuring the “peaceable and authoritative termination
of occurring controversies” and “uniform authority of the laws,”173 but I am
not sure that Madison drifted so far. Madison’s letter to Everett was addressing
the nullification movement,174 and in that context, it is probably best read to
be addressing a different structural issue: the importance of the Supreme
Court’s role in resolving particular cases rather than settling broad principles of
law175—a distinction central to the history of the judicial power.176 If so, then
the letter is more relevant to intricate federal courts questions about the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction177 and less likely to reflect a change in
Madison’s views on liquidation.
2.

Federal spending

A different example of Madison’s concern over liquidation can be seen in
legislative debates over Congress’s power to spend. Madison was a lifelong
skeptic of Alexander Hamilton’s view that Congress’s power “[t]o lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”178 allowed it to
spend money on matters outside of its enumerated powers.179 (Madison was
172. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV.

L. REV. 4, 107-09 (2001).
173. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), https://perma.cc/9DMC

174.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

-8EE9, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 383, 388-95;
see Kramer, supra note 172, at 107 & n.454.
See Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 173, at 383 (“I have duly
received your letter in which you refer to the ‘nullifying doctrine’ advocated, as a
Constitutional right, by some of our distinguished fellow citizens; . . . and you express a
wish for my ideas on those subjects.”).
See id. at 397 (referring to “the concession of this power to the Supreme Court, in cases
falling within the course of its functions” (emphasis added)).
See generally William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008).
See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
For Hamilton’s view, see Alexander Hamilton, Sec’y of the Treasury, Final Version of
the Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), https://perma.cc/39XM
-69R2, reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 302-04 (Harold C.
Syrett ed., 1966). For Madison’s, see, for example, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896-97 (1791)
(statement of Rep. Madison); and James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in
1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra
note 45, at 584, 584-85.
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also skeptical, a fortiori, of the view, even broader than Hamilton’s, that the
General Welfare Clause allowed Congress effectively plenary power to legislate,
not just to spend.)180 As a representative in Congress, Madison seems to have
focused on these issues with a particular eye to the problems posed by
liquidation. He repeatedly worried that spending on sympathetic causes would
create legislative precedent in support of a broader spending power.
For instance, in 1792, the Senate proposed to pay a “bounty” to those
working in the cod fishing industry,181 apparently in response to the heavy
trade barriers the fisheries faced internationally.182 In the debate on the bill in
the House, Madison claimed to share the widespread “disposition . . . to afford
every constitutional encouragement to the fisheries,” but expressed a worry
about a broad interpretation of the General Welfare Clause.183 But, he argued,
it might be different if the “bounty” were relabeled an “allowance,”184 and so it
was.185 This minor change made a big difference to Madison, who argued that
so long as the cod fishers were just receiving a tax break against preexisting
taxes (such as the salt tax), no general spending power was needed.186 Hence the
cod fisheries bill could be passed187 without setting a legislative precedent.
It happened again two years later, when a group of French citizens were
driven off the island of Hispaniola and took refuge in Baltimore, where they
begged for federal relief.188 “Virtually everyone wanted to help.”189 Once again,
Madison came up with a trick. He pointed out that the United States still owed
money to France from the American Revolution, and could characterize the
180. See Alison L. LaCroix, Essay, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2082-83,

2083 n.162 (2014) (attributing this view to Judge Alexander Addison of Pennsylvania).
181. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 66-69 (1792) (passing the bill titled “An Act for the

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

187.
188.
189.

encouragement of the bank and other cod fisheries, and for the regulation and
government of the fishermen employed therein”).
See CURRIE, supra note 78, at 168-69.
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 385-86 (1792) (statement of Rep. Madison).
See id. at 386.
See id. at 397 (debating “a motion to strike out the words ‘bounty now allowed,’ and
insert allowance now made”); id. at 400-01 (passing the amended bill in the House).
Id. at 386 (statement of Rep. Madison) (“[I]f, in the allowance, nothing more is proposed
than a mere reimbursement of the sum advanced, it is only paying a debt . . . .”); see also
id. at 366 (statement of Rep. Goodhue) (“[N]o bounty is required. We only ask, in
another mode, the usual drawback for the salt used on the fish.”); CURRIE, supra note 78,
at 169; cf. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1996) (suggesting that Madison was unusually influential in
Congress because of his attention to legislative detail and ability “to dissect issues and
alternatives with . . . rigor”).
See Act of Feb. 16, 1792, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 229 (amended 1800).
See CURRIE, supra note 78, at 188.
Id.
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spending as partial payment on the debt.190 This allowed Congress “to relieve
the sufferers” without “establishing a dangerous precedent” that would allow “a
right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their
constituents.”191
In 1796, Congress had its biggest fight about the scope of the spending
power over relief to the city of Savannah, which had been devastated by a
fire.192 Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but this time Madison was not around to
come up with a dodge,193 and the measure was defeated in the House.194
Madison’s repeated focus on avoiding “establishing a dangerous
precedent”195 suggests a recognition of the dynamics of liquidation. It wasn’t
just judicial decisions that might be used to expand an ambiguous
constitutional power; legislative decisions could do so, too.196 To be sure, under
liquidation as Madison expressed it, a single instance of legislative precedent
did not itself settle the constitutional question—that took an accumulation of
precedent, a course of practice. So Madison’s worry must have been one of two
things: either he was trying to prevent even a single precedent in favor of a
broad spending power because he was afraid they would build up, and wanted
to fight each battle in the war, or he was in fact trying to establish the
liquidation of his view—the narrower spending power—which might fail if
there were clear instances of the contrary practice.

190. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 171 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison).
191. Id. at 170.
192. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1712-27 (1796).
193. See id. at 1727 (showing Madison’s absence from the roll call vote). And where was

James Madison during the Savannah fire debate on December 28, 1796? He was still a
member of Congress for another few months, see BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-2005, H.R. DOC. NO. 108-222, at 1488-89 (2005), and he
appeared in debates the day before and two days after, see 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1705, 1744
(1796). I have been unable to find an explicit account of his disappearance, but we do
know that it had recently been so cold that he was deterred from going outside. See
Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Dec. 25, 1796), https://perma.cc
/T7UE-KJAJ, reprinted in 16 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 435, 436 (J.C.A. Stagg et al.
eds., 1989) (“The weather has been so intensely cold that I have not yet gone out to the
proper office with Saml. French’s Certificate.” (footnote omitted)). That session,
Madison also faced “a housing problem, not eased by the fact that twenty-two-year-old
Fanny Madison came along for the winter.” IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF
THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800, at 443, 445 (1950).
194. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1727 (1796).
195. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison).
196. See MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 20-23 (2013) (describing Congress’s fear of
establishing precedent through spending legislation and suggesting it came from “[t]he
perception of Congress as both legislature and court”).
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In any event, it is worth noting one irony. Subsequent commentary
suggests that Madison was quite right to worry about establishing a legislative
precedent, but wrong to think that his formalisms would do the trick. When
Justice Story later endorsed Hamilton’s view of the General Welfare Clause, he
remarked in support:
In regard to the practice of the government, it has been entirely in conformity to
the principles here laid down. Appropriations have never been limited by
congress to cases falling within the specific powers enumerated in the
constitution . . . . In some cases, not silently, but upon discussion, congress has
gone the length of making appropriations to aid destitute foreigners, . . . as in the
relief of the St. Domingo refugees, in 1794 . . . . An illustration equally forcible, of a
domestic character, is in the bounty given in the codfisheries, which was
strenuously resisted on constitutional grounds in 1792; but which still maintains
its place in the statute book of the United States.197

Justice Story was apparently unaware of, or unwilling to credit, Madison’s
justifications for these appropriations. Similarly, Edward Corwin would much
later describe “a subsidy to the cod fisheries—a proposal against which Madison
vainly urged his narrow doctrine of the power of expenditure.”198 Future
interpreters failed to understand Madison’s precedents, despite his careful
maneuvering.199
D. Beyond Madison?
Of course, James Madison’s views are not the only ones that matter. For
instance, to the extent that scholars argue that Founding-era interpretive
conventions remain binding today, it is either because they represent
widespread “original methods” of interpretation or the “law of
197. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 988

(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). “St. Domingo” was the contemporary reference for
the French colony on the island of Hispaniola. See CURRIE, supra note 78, at 188.
198. Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV.
L. REV. 548, 554 (1923). Corwin, unlike Justice Story, had the benefits of Benton’s
Abridgment, see id. at 554 & n.17 (citing 1 THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE
DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 350-70 (New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1857)), but seems to have missed the combination of Madison’s solution, see 1 BENTON,
supra, at 361-62, and the subsequent amendment, see id. at 368-69. Or perhaps he simply
found Madison’s views so unpersuasive as not to merit comment. Cf. John Harrison,
Book Review, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 388 (1998) (reviewing CURRIE, supra note 78)
(calling Madison’s proposal a “sophistry . . . that somewhat undercut Madison’s
position”). But see John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause,
4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (2001) (crediting Madison’s approach).
199. For more on the path of constitutional spending debates as Madison’s grip loosened, see
Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment,
67 STAN. L. REV. 397 (2015). See also DAUBER, supra note 196, at 29 (noting that in
nineteenth-century congressional debates, “[o]ccasionally, hoary standards like
Madison’s vote in favor of the St. Domingo relief bill . . . were recounted”).
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interpretation.”200 While this Article does not attempt to provide an equally
comprehensive examination of non-Madisonian liquidation, the general idea
was invoked by others during the early years of the republic, if not necessarily
in all its technical particulars.
For instance, after Madison’s more famous reference to liquidation in
Federalist No. 37,201 Alexander Hamilton used the same term in two of his own
essays focusing on judicial review. In Federalist No. 78 he wrote that when
“there are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with
each other, . . . it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning
and operation.”202 And in the opening paragraph of Federalist No. 82 he wrote of
the constitutional system: “‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so
compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust
them to each other in a harmonious and consistent whole.”203
We have already seen that the Supreme Court invoked a similar idea in
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland.204 So
too had Justice Paterson’s opinion for the Court a few decades earlier in Stuart v.
Laird, which upheld the assignment of Supreme Court Justices to sit as circuit
judges because “practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years,
commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an
irresistable answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”205
Similar ideas seem to have abounded in other courts, as Caleb Nelson has
argued.206 For instance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts glossed an
ambiguous statute in reliance on “the understanding and application of it,
when the statute first [came] into operation, sanctioned by long acquiescence
200. For more on the “original methods” view, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). For more on the “law of
interpretation” view, see William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017). See also Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 27, at 143 (“The
framers’ law of the written Constitution included the idea of liquidation.”). Another
related view with roots back to Roman law is put forth by Richard Epstein. See
Richard A. Epstein, Lecture, Our Implied Constitution, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 295, 309
(2017).
See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 525.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 553 (emphasis omitted).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02 (1819); see supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
See Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 26, at 14-21 (“The Madisonian concept of
‘liquidation’ dominated antebellum case law. Court after court used its framework to
think about the effect of past decisions interpreting written laws.”); see also id. at 14 n.42
(citing Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 122, 144 (1821); Respublica v. Roberts,
1 Yeates 6, 7 (Pa. 1791) (per curiam); and Minnis v. Echols, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 31, 36
(1808) (opinion of Roane, J.)).
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on the part of the legislature, and judicial tribunals.”207 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania did so in reliance on “constant practice.”208 And Judge Roane of
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, years before receiving Madison’s
much-quoted letter on liquidation, invoked “the practice and general
understanding of the country.”209
Many of these cases reflect what Aditya Bamzai has called the principles of
“customary” and “contemporaneous” exposition,210 which can be seen in U.S.
Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution as well. For instance, in
Cohens v. Virginia, the Court upheld its jurisdiction over state court judgments
in part because “in the Congress which passed [the Judiciary Act of 1789] were
many eminent members of the Convention which formed the constitution.”211
Justice Johnson made similar remarks in his separate opinion in Ogden v.
Saunders.212 And in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Court relied on both “long
acquiescence” in Congress’s power to pass the Fugitive Slave Act and
“contemporaneous expositions of it.”213 It is arguable that these principles are
another reflection of the concept of liquidation,214 but they might also reflect
distinct but related legal rules of interpretation. The widespread references to
customary interpretation during this period did not always discuss the
elements of liquidation that Madison consistently stressed: indeterminacy,
deliberate practice, and settlement.

207. See Packard, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) at 144.
208. See Respublica, 1 Yeates at 7 (per curiam) (concluding from longstanding practice that an

209.
210.
211.
212.

213.
214.

unmarried man who had sex with a married woman could be guilty only of
fornication, not adultery); see also id. (“Had the case been res integra, the decision of the
Court might be different from what it now is. It is true that practice sub silentio will not
make the law, but it is strong evidence of what the law is.”).
See Minnis, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) at 36 (opinion of Roane, J.); see also Letter from James
Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48.
See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE
L.J. 908, 930-47 (2017).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73,
85-87.
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827) (opinion of Johnson, J.) (“[T]he cotemporaries of the
constitution have claims to our deference on the question of right, because they had the
best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers of the
constitution . . . .”); see also Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827)
(same principles in statutory interpretation).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 620-21 (1842); see also Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
See Bamzai, supra note 210, at 938-40 (connecting these principles to Madison’s and
Hamilton’s essays in The Federalist). But see Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 310 (1989) (“Although only
Madison and Hamilton appear to have descanted on the liquidation of meaning, other
Federalists also argued that interpretation would resolve difficulties.”).
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To know for sure whether Madison’s concept of liquidation has some kind
of binding legal force today—whether as an original method, or as part of “our
law” of interpretation—one would need to conduct a more systematic review
of Founding-era views beyond Madison’s. But one hopes that this explication
of the concept will help frame and direct any such future investigations.
III. Grounding Liquidation
Up until now, my analysis has been descriptive and analytic—an attempt
to discover what liquidation is (or was). But liquidation is more than a
historical curio. It also serves several deep constitutional values that may give
it continuing relevance and allure today. As noted above, liquidation might
turn out to be of importance to those who subscribe to various “originalist”
methods of constitutional interpretation. But it is not, and need not be, just
that. It also can be used to support and implement such broader constitutional
norms as departmentalism, precedent, and tradition.
A. Departmentalism
Our Constitution’s text, structure, and lived tradition all point to an
important fact: Constitutional interpretation is a shared activity, not the
monopoly of the federal courts. That is evident in the particular
responsibilities that the Constitution imposes on each branch,215 as well as in
the broader principles of coordinacy and separation of powers that the
document embodies.216 At least as importantly, it is evident in our
constitutional tradition, in which elected officials have frequently been sources
of constitutional argument and forces for constitutional fidelity—and also for
change.217
Liquidation provides a source of constitutional law that accommodates and
encourages that departmentalism. Liquidation is shared among the branches,
215. See Paul Brest, Essay, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27

STAN. L. REV. 585, 587-89 (1975); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 905, 906-13 (1989-1990).
216. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 128-44 (2004); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Essay, Judicial Exclusivity
and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 85-90 (1998); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Essay,
The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2724-31 (2003).
217. See KRAMER, supra note 216, at 128-44; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Reply, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027,
1029 n.16, 1037-42 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 804-06, 847-48 (2002);
see also William Baude, Response, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 39, 39-42 (2014).
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rather than being monopolized by the judiciary.218 Indeed, as discussed above,
Madison argued that the departmentalist nature of liquidation was key to its
legitimacy: Each branch had reasons to seek popular approval of its views and
hence to demonstrate the reasonableness of its interpretation to the public.219
This “public sanction”220 gave liquidation a sort of quasiconstitutional status.
Popular ratification, of course, was responsible for the authority of the
Constitution itself, and only a similar process could alter or abolish it. But an
indirect public sanction still gave liquidated decisions enough connection to
the basis of constitutional legitimacy that it had a subconstitutional legal
status—one that was powerful enough to override individual judgments of
government officials in indeterminate cases.221
At the same time, liquidation also tames one of the most cited risks of
departmentalism, namely the risk of unceasing chaos and disorder.222
Liquidation supplies a relatively specific doctrinal structure by which
interbranch constitutional disputes can be judged and ultimately settled. It lets
us get somewhere and move on.223 And yet it does so in a way that is true to the
core values of departmentalism, by avoiding the unilateral imposition of
constitutional values by one branch upon the others.
B. Precedent
Another widely shared constitutional value is that of judicial precedent.
Indeed, entire theories of constitutional interpretation have been built around
precedent, and even most originalists have grown to accommodate it.224
Liquidation has a close relationship to the idea of judicial precedent, and it may
218. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 1776; Nelson, Originalism, supra note 26, at 527.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
220. See Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 70, at 372.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
222. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the

Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 321-31 (1994) (discussing when departmentalism will and will
not lead to final resolution).
223. For an argument that originalist legislators should find ways to avoid questioning
“super precedent,” see Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional
Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 23-42 (2016).
224. See William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2358-61
(2015). Likewise, those originalists who reject precedent entirely would probably reject
liquidation for the same reasons. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1168-69
(2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 912-13 (2009); see also Peter J. Smith, The Marshall
Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 635-36 (2006) (criticizing such
an approach).
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therefore be able to find just as ready a place in constitutional law. Indeed, for
departmentalists, liquidation could even go so far as to replace our current
judge-centered doctrine of stare decisis.
Because the relationship between liquidation to precedent has changed
over time, it helps to first consider liquidation’s relationship to precedent at the
Founding, and then consider its relationship to modern principles of stare
decisis.
1.

Founding-era precedent

Madison repeatedly analogized liquidation and precedent; one might even
go so far as to say that liquidation simply was a form of precedent.225 For
instance, on several occasions Madison referred to liquidation as “legislative
precedents.”226 The question, Madison wrote to Charles Ingersoll, was “how far
legislative precedents expounding the Constitution, ought to guide succeeding
legislatures, and to overrule individual opinions.”227 And the answer, wrote
Madison, “has its true Analogy in the obligation, arising from Judicial
expositions of the law on succeeding Judges; the Constitution being a law to
the Legislator, as the law is a rule of decision to the Judge.”228
Madison went on to argue that judicial precedents had “authoritative
force” because they allowed the law to “be certain and Known” and because if
they were “publicly made, and repeatedly confirmed,” they were likely to have
the sanction of the public.229 By analogy, he said elsewhere, “Legislative
precedents” were “entitled to little respect” when they were “without full
examination & deliberation.”230
The analogy had extra force at the Founding because the doctrine of
judicial precedent was different than it is today. It generally required a line of
cases, not just the dictate of a single case. John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport have examined “the English legal system” as well as “the American
experience, first in the colonies, then in the independent states and during the
ratification debates, and finally in the Supreme Court under the new

225. For earlier work on the analogy, see Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra note 26, at 10-14.
226. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 183-84; Letter
227.
228.
229.
230.

from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 103, at 320.
Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 103, at 320.
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Constitution” and concluded that “[i]n all of these periods . . . precedent rules
conferred greater weight on a series of decisions than on a single decision,”
though the exact details varied.231
According to another account, in England “the strict doctrine of stare
decisis . . . under which the holding of a particular case is treated as binding . . .
was a product of the nineteenth-century mind.”232 By contrast, “the doctrine of
precedent” that existed before that “was more closely related to the concept of
mos judiciorum, judicial custom; it was a line of cases, rather than a single
decision, that ought not to be overturned in the absence of very weighty
reasons.”233 Another study, this one of early American cases, suggests that “up
to the year 1800,” the older precedent model controlled, and the modern
doctrine of stare decisis “solidified” by 1850.234 Whatever the exact historical
details, the importance in the Founding era of a line of multiple cases suggests
how natural it was for Madison to equate liquidation to the doctrine of judicial
precedent.
As these accounts also show, the doctrine of precedent changed over the
course of the nineteenth century to become closer to the stare decisis model we
know today. And while the exact time and place of the transition is debated,
the older vision of precedent remained important in constitutional law for
some time after the Founding, as demonstrated by Abraham Lincoln.
In Lincoln’s first major speech on the force of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dred Scott v. Sandford,235 he discussed precedent in terms resembling the
model of liquidation. In that speech, Lincoln stressed the distinction between
two functions of judicial decisions—their judgments in particular cases, which
“absolutely determine the case decided,” and their prospective status as
“‘precedents’ and ‘authorities.’”236 Lincoln did not deny that Supreme Court
231. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103

NW. U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2009).
232. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From

Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (1996).
233. Id. For further debate among scholars of English history about the timing of this point,

see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 231, at 813 (citing CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW
IN THE MAKING 219 n.1 (7th ed. 1964); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 349-50 (5th ed. 1956); and W.S. Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 LAW Q.
REV. 180, 180 (1934)).
234. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850,
3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 50 (1959).
235. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
236. Abraham Lincoln, The Dred Scott Decision: Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26,
1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 352, 355 (Roy P. Basler ed., 3d
prtg. 1946) [hereinafter Lincoln Dred Scott Speech]. For a defense of this distinction, see
generally Baude, supra note 176.
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decisions had precedential force “when fully settled.”237 But, he said, “[j]udicial
decisions are of greater or less authority as precedents, according to
circumstances.”238 To wit:
If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of the
judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with legal
public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments throughout
our history, and had been in no part, based on assumed historical facts which are
not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it had been before the court more
than once, and had there been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years,
it then might be, perhaps would be, factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not
acquiesce in it as a precedent.
But when, as it is true we find it wanting in all these claims to the public
confidence, it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to
treat it as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country.239

Lincoln’s criteria for settled precedent contain several similarities to those
for liquidation. The search for “steady practice of the departments,” or else one
having “been affirmed and re-affirmed through a course of years,” resembles
liquidation’s requirement of a course of deliberate practice. The search for
unanimity and a lack of partisanship mirror some of the elements of
constitutional settlement or acquiescence. This suggests that the potential
analogy between liquidation and judicial precedent persisted in some high
quarters even in the second half of the nineteenth century.
2.

Modern stare decisis

By contrast to the gradualism of the Founding era, under the modern
doctrine of stare decisis, judicial precedent is generally thought to settle
controversies in one go.240 When parties argue a case before the Supreme
Court today, even a single old case will be taken very seriously. Think of the
effort the Justices spent parsing and distinguishing United States v. Miller241

237. Lincoln Dred Scott Speech, supra note 236, at 355. For more on Lincoln’s evolution on

238.
239.
240.

241.

this issue, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1227 (2008).
Lincoln Dred Scott Speech, supra note 236, at 355.
Id.
See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV.
105, 135-37 (2015) (asking the question, “Does a single decision carry the power to settle
an issue?” and answering yes).
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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when interpreting the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller,242 or
the focus the Court gave to Kentucky v. Dennison243 when it reconsidered the
case 126 years later in Puerto Rico v. Branstad.244
Even more emphatically, lower courts are not today supposed to say
something along the lines of, “Well, I know that the Supreme Court just ruled
the Voting Rights Act245 (or a flag burning statute246 or the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines247) unconstitutional, but I’m going to keep enforcing it for a while
and see if the decision sticks.” And the apparent exceptions—such as Judge
Silberman announcing that he would effectively nullify Boumediene v. Bush
unless the Supreme Court made him stop,248 or lower courts seeming to resist
the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller249—are sufficiently rare and
controversial to prove the point.250 Whatever the reality, the modern ideal of
judicial precedent is based on the settling power of a single case.
To be sure, a single controversial precedent may still face resistance. In
some cases, for instance, a dissenting Justice will repeatedly dissent as an issue
recurs, as Justice Breyer has famously done in sovereign immunity cases,251 or
as Justice Stevens did in hundreds of cases applying the obscure procedural rule
of Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals.252 But in these examples of
242. See 554 U.S. 570, 621-25 (2008); id. at 661-64, 663 n.30, 676-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
244. See 483 U.S. at 220-21, 224-26.
245. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
246. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,

402 (1989).
247. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
248. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921,

249.
250.
251.

252.

963-65 (2016) (quoting Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman,
J., concurring)); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See Re, supra note 248, at 961-63 (citing Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406,
412 (7th Cir. 2015); and United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)).
See id. at 965-66 (arguing that this sort of “resistance will likely remain limited to only a
small, if important, subset of Supreme Court cases”).
See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 788 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Today’s decision reaffirms the need for continued dissent . . . .”); Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“I am not yet ready to adhere to the proposition of law set forth in
Seminole Tribe [v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)].”); see also Charles Fried, Comment, Five to
Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 177-80 (2002)
(collecting more examples); Allison Orr Larsen, Essay, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 447, 447-49, 454-58 (2008) (same).
506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). The Court sanctioned James Martin, a pro se litigant
seeking to file in forma pauperis, for his “repetitious and frivolous petitions for
certiorari.” Id. at 2-3. Justice Stevens dissented on the basis that the Court’s resources
“could be used more effectively by simply denying Martin’s petitions than by drafting,
footnote continued on next page
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“perpetual dissents,”253 the dissenting Justice was there when the first case was
decided, watching the putative legal mistake unfold before his very eyes. As
Allison Orr Larsen has observed, today’s Justices are “more willing to overrule
precedents from which [they] dissented originally.”254
Modern stare decisis’s focus on the single case stands in opposition to
Madison’s vision of liquidation, which required both repeated decisions and
enough acquiescence that one could say that those decisions had acquired the
public sanction. This meant that ramming through a controversial decision of
constitutional principle was not enough to force others to accept that principle
in future cases. For instance, the fact that the Fifth Congress passed the Sedition
Act255 did not mean that future legislators or Presidents were required to
accept it as constitutional. Indeed, the Democratic-Republican repudiation of
the Act contributed to ensuring that liquidation did not happen—or at least not
in favor of the Act.256
Or for a modern example of the contrast between liquidation and modern
stare decisis, consider the passage and litigation of the Affordable Care Act.257
When the Act passed Congress and was signed by the President, that was
obviously a big victory for those who supported the legislation. But it did not

253.
254.

255.
256.

257.

entering, and policing the order the Court enters today.” Id. at 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
My Westlaw search found 290 “Martinization” orders from which Justice Stevens
dissented. See also John Paul Stevens, Foreword to KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS
JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF JOHN PAUL STEVENS, at ix, xi (2001) (“[A]t
virtually every Court conference I find myself dissenting from three or four orders
imposing special burdens on this disfavored class of litigants.”).
See generally Larsen, supra note 251.
Id. at 448; see also id. at 468-75 (criticizing this attitude as a form of “self stare decisis”).
This difference might be explained if the judicial oath locks in at the time that a judge
takes the bench; this would mean that he or she takes past legal changes as given, but
leaves future changes more debatable. See Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 299, 330-33 (2016); see also William Baude, The Power of Promises,
JOTWELL (July 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/8WZX-9PMY (reviewing Re, supra).
Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
See Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 693-94 (2002). The Supreme Court
later claimed that “the great controversy over the Sedition Act . . . first crystallized a
national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment” and that “the court
of history” had concluded that “the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon
criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First
Amendment.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273, 276 (1964). For a critical
analysis of this opposition to the Sedition Act, see Jud Campbell, The Invention of First
Amendment Federalism, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://perma.cc/966R
-CAF4. For a subsequent invocation of “the court of history,” see Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (expressing that Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
“has been overruled in the court of history”).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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constitute liquidation. Its passage was just a single decision, not a course of
decisions, and its passage by relatively tight and partisan margins did not
bespeak confidence that the Act had the kind of broad public sanction that
Madison would seek.258 When the Act was (mostly) upheld by the Supreme
Court,259 that was also a big victory for its supporters. And this time it
established a precedent. There were just as few decisions—one—and the margin
was just as tight (though not quite as partisan). But a 5-4 Supreme Court vote is
binding under the doctrine of stare decisis, while a 279-251 vote in Congress260
and the President’s signature do not constitute liquidation—as more recent
attacks on the Affordable Care Act have confirmed.261
3.

Implications

So what are we to make of these differences when thinking about how to
use liquidation? One possibility is that they suggest liquidation is largely useless
to the courts and would be relevant only to constitutional reasoning by the
legislative and executive branches.262 The argument would be that the doctrine
of stare decisis is likely to crowd out the use of liquidation in many cases.263
Maybe one reason that the Supreme Court didn’t confront liquidation in so
many words until 2014264—and so rarely confronts it even implicitly—is that
it’s unusual for the Court to get a case in which liquidation is relevant but
judicial precedent is not. By the time a close question has come up repeatedly in
the political branches, it has probably come up at least once in the Supreme
Court, unless it is the kind of question that never comes up in court.
But there is another possibility: to use the insights of liquidation to move
closer to the historical notions of precedent. Even putting aside their historical
connection, liquidation and stare decisis have similar normative aims. Both
doctrines are about generating legal certainty by giving weight to past
258. See BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 58-59, 71-73.
259. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012).
260. See H.R.3590—Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://perma.cc

/VYE7-ZZ8H (archived Nov. 25, 2018).
261. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017)

(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c) (2017)) (eliminating the penalty for
violating the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate).
262. For a related argument that “nonjudicial precedent[]” undercuts “judicial supremacy,”
see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 145-46 (2008). For a discussion of
the even more radical argument that legislative precedent should supplant judicial
review entirely, see Nelson, Originalism, supra note 26, at 528 n.38.
263. See Joseph Blocher & Margaret H. Lemos, Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss Games,
106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 10-12 (2016).
264. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560-67 (2014); supra notes 19-25 and
accompanying text.
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decisions.265 They seek certainty partly to avoid disruption—most people
trying to get along in the world should not have to fear that settled legal
decisions could be easily discarded. They seek certainty partly for epistemic
reasons—it may not be possible for any one person (or even any one group of
people at a particular moment in time) to adequately reason through every
hard legal problem with adequate certainty. And they do so partly for reasons
that border on humility—a sense that legal interpretation is a sufficiently
shared enterprise that in some circumstances individual judgments should be
subordinated to more widely shared ones.266
At the same time, both stare decisis and liquidation also recognize that
however important certainty and stability and humility may be, mistakes are a
bad thing. The accumulation of precedents accumulates the risk of error. In the
case of constitutional interpretation, that means the risk of failing to fulfill the
text’s aims, and especially the risk that government agents will stray too far
outside the boundaries of their legal commissions. Indeed, it has been charged
that stare decisis inevitably “corrupts” and “works in opposition to correct
interpretation of the Constitution.”267
So both stare decisis and liquidation try to compromise between ideal
constitutional interpretation and accepted constitutional interpretation. Stare
decisis does this, of course, through judicial decisions and the rules for
overruling them. Liquidation does this through settlement, as well as the limits
on that settlement (such as the indeterminacy requirement). But as noted
above, liquidation does so in a manner that is truer to the departmentalism
embedded in our constitutional structure and tradition.268
So those who support the basic goals of modern stare decisis might still
consider whether those goals could be better accomplished by replacing stare
decisis with something more gradual. Such a shift would yield a system that
continued to mix settled law with an occasional return to first principles—but
in a way that would be more democratic and more likely to match legal
settlement to settlement in practice.
This shift could happen in a limited way or a broader one. The limited way
might retain much of our current discourse and rules for stare decisis but
tweak them by waiting for multiple concordant decisions to accumulate before
calling an issue truly settled. This would be a liquidation-informed notion of
judicial precedent.

265. See McConnell, supra note 27, at 1776 (“Both allow for change, but only slowly.”).
266. See generally KOZEL, supra note 64.
267. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST.

COMMENT. 289, 298 (2005).
268. See supra Part III.A.
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A broader possibility is also worth considering. This would be to abandon
our judge-centric tradition of precedent entirely, replacing it with the
principles of liquidation. Courts would, like any other branch, adhere to
constitutional settlements of indeterminate provisions resulting from a
deliberate course of practice. A court’s own precedents might become settled
when the other branches of government acquiesced in them over time. But a
court’s precedents might need to be abandoned when met with a sufficiently
widespread course of hostility, depending on the indeterminacy of the
constitutional provision.
This kind of change would raise much broader questions of constitutional
theory than can be dealt with here. It would of course butt against some
assertions of judicial supremacy,269 and there are debates about whether it
would restore, or instead transform, our deepest commitments in
constitutional law.270 So for now it is simply worth observing that it is one
path that liquidation might lead us toward, though not inevitably so.
C. Tradition
Apart from liquidation’s specific connection to legal rules of precedent, it
can also be seen more generally as a form of tradition.
The normative arguments for following tradition are contested, but their
general outline is well known. Some of those arguments come in a practical,
consequentialist form. One practical argument draws on principles of natural
selection. The argument is that a tradition’s longevity reflects its conduciveness
to human welfare: “If a practice is adopted by many different communities, and
maintained for a considerable period of time, this provides strong evidence that
the practice contributes to the common good and accords with the spirit and
mores of the people.”271
Another practical argument draws on principles of distributed
information. Adherence to tradition is said to respect the “accumulated wisdom

269. Contra Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[W]henever the

Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution . . . , its decision requires an equally rare precedential force to counter
the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation.”).
270. For a preliminary exploration, see William Baude, The Court, or the Constitution?, in
MORAL PUZZLES AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY
ALEXANDER (Heidi M. Hurd ed., forthcoming 2019), https://perma.cc/6B4H-XE5P.
271. Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 665, 683; see also id. (“To be sure, there can be bad, evil, or counterproductive
traditions; but if so, one would expect to see a movement away from them.”).
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of many generations” and to “reflect a kind of rough empiricism.”272 It is said to
reflect “a recognition of bounded rationality.”273 Others formalize this point
through use of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which holds that under certain
assumptions, a greater number of independent minds are more likely to get to
the truth.274
There are also more directly moral arguments for tradition, though these
are harder to paraphrase. Most prominent are arguments from cultural
continuity: for instance, the “ancient but now largely discredited idea that the
past has an authority of its own” because “the world of culture that we inherit
from it makes us who we are.”275 Similarly, Edmund Burke described
traditional rights as a “patrimony” (of course) and “an entailed inheritance
derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity.”276
To be sure, these arguments have also met with extensive criticisms,
including a call for “a pragmatic and critical attitude toward the blindness,
cruelty, and selfishness of the past.”277 The natural selection arguments have
been said to founder because “lacking central direction, custom tends to lag
behind social and economic change—or may be the product of incentives that
diverge from the socially desirable.”278 The information-based arguments have
been said to be “intrinsically fragile and institutionally ungrounded.”279 The

272. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891-92

(1996).
273. Id. at 894; see also EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION 329 (1981) (“The fact is that our knowledge

of future events is very poor and very unreliable.”).
274. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 370-72 (2006).
275. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047, 1066 (1990); see

also SHILS, supra note 273, at 328-30 (discussing the inherent value of tradition).
276. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: A CRITICAL EDITION 183

(J.C.D. Clark ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790) (emphasis omitted). Burke also made
a very brief version of the informational argument. See id. at 251 (“We are afraid to put
men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that
this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail
themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages.”).
277. Martha C. Nussbaum, Janus-Faced Law: A Philosophical Debate, in THE TIMING OF
LAWMAKING 249, 274 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017).
278. Richard A. Posner, Hayek, Law, and Cognition, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 147, 162 (2005); see
also id. (“Customs may in short be vestigial and dysfunctional.”).
279. Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1483 (2007); see also Nussbaum, supra note 277, at 256 (“The
experience argument . . . gives us at best a default rule.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process
Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2008) (“[S]ome appealing defenses of due
process traditionalism turn out to be quite fragile.”); Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds
Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 16-18 (2009) (criticizing “[t]he
fallacious idea that tradition is the collective analogue of individual wisdom”).
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argument that the past has its own normative force has been called “mystical”280
and limited to benefiting “societies’ privileged and dominant members.”281
Wherever these debates stand, liquidation can be seen as a form of
argument from tradition. By looking to a publicly acclaimed course of practice
over time, liquidation may avail itself of both the welfarist and nonwelfarist
justifications for tradition. That most people over time have favored a course
of practice gives us added reason to think that practice is right. And if we think
that adherence to tradition is valuable for its own sake, then liquidated
constitutional traditions should have similar value.
Michael McConnell has been most explicit in making this connection,
suggesting that the methodology of liquidation is the same as the
“traditionalism” emblematized by cases like Washington v. Glucksberg, which
focused on “history and tradition.”282 Of traditionalism, he once argued that it
is grounded in the many-minds argument—“the assumption that when many
people, over a period of many years, have come to a particular conclusion,
this is more reliable than the attempt of any one person (even oneself) or
small group of persons.”283 Others have invoked an explicitly Burkean idea of
“conventionalism” as a reason to look at things like “postenactment
legislation . . . grounded in an understanding of the contested provision” and
“the evolved practice of different branches.”284
Liquidation provides a particularly democratic and structured way to
harness this kind of traditionalism in constitutional law. The discarding of bad
traditions is part of the natural selection account of tradition; by analogy, the
indeterminacy requirement should result in the discarding of interpretations
that are clearly inconsistent with the constitutional text. Liquidation also
captures some benefit of the informational arguments, because it looks for
multiple instances of practice before a settlement can be established. By
requiring that practice to be deliberate, it also avoids the critique that tradition
can be mindless or unthinking. By looking to settlement across both
institutions and parties, and ideally with the public sanction, it attempts to
entrench traditions that have been found acceptable by many groups of people.

280. See Sunstein, supra note 274, at 369 n.82, 407.
281. Nussbaum, supra note 277, at 252-53.
282. See 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,

503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); McConnell, supra note 27, at 1771 & n.106 (citing
Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution,
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 174 [hereinafter McConnell, Tradition]).
283. McConnell, supra note 271, at 684.
284. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 509, 511-12
(1996).
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And by giving these traditions some normative force and attempting to
harmonize them with the constitutional text, liquidation bears some affinity
with arguments from cultural continuity. Tradition provides yet another
grounding for constitutional liquidation.
D. Possible Shortcomings
From its name down to its mechanics, liquidation has something
unsatisfying about it. It doesn’t invoke aspiration, the march of progress, or
constitutional dreams working themselves pure. Nor does it invoke
constitutional fidelity or perfection. It smacks of stagnation and compromise. It
smacks of loss. Those connotations are not inapt, but that need not be a bad
thing.
Liquidation itself seems designed to operate as a compromise on multiple
levels. In the immediate sense, it is about enabling and adhering to stable
political compromises. Rather than having us fight over every constitutional
question at every moment, liquidation tries to settle many of them, so that the
working business of government can go on.
Liquidation is also about compromise in the broader methodological sense.
It is not quite an alternative, but rather an adjunct, to more complete methods
of constitutional interpretation. Liquidation both presupposes that one has
some other, preexisting theory of constitutional interpretation, and tries to
provide occasions on which one should be willing to forgo that theory. For
originalists, this means forgoing some attempts to divine the Constitution’s
true original meaning; for those with more aspirational theories, this means
forgoing the best that the Constitution can be.285 In a sense, liquidation is a
response to imperfection, both in constitutional substance and constitutional
interpretation.
Because liquidation draws from historical practice, it is also potentially
vulnerable to the criticisms made against historical practice generally. But in
fact, the specific mechanics of liquidation do a fair job of deflecting the
criticisms of historical practice made in recent scholarship. For instance, Shalev
Roisman has argued that some theories of historical practice in constitutional
interpretation make overly profligate use of the concept of interbranch
“acquiescence.”286 This usage can be problematic because past practice often
reflects nonconstitutional concerns, and, moreover, “will systematically serve

285. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 407-13 (1986) (advocating for interpreting law in

a way that helps us become “the people we want to be” and build “the community we
aim to have”).
286. See Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 672-74
(2016).
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to validate the power of the more active and powerful branch.”287 Roisman
goes on to argue that looking to governmental acquiescence can still be
justified, but only if “there is evidence that the branches were at least aware of
the constitutional issue at hand and, if so, that they were likely motivated by
constitutional analysis.”288
As it happens, liquidation provides a way to harness insights from
historical practice that avoids this critique. As we have seen, Madison stressed
both points. Liquidation required attention to the constitutional issue, and
disdained reliance on “midnight precedents” from Congress, such as when
“owing to the termination of their session every other year at a fixed day &
hour, a mass of business is struck off as it were at short hand & in a moment.”289
And it required a practice that reflected the “naked question of
constitutionality,” rather than policy considerations.290
Leah Litman has also argued that courts are too willing to conclude that
the novelty of a federal statute is evidence of its unconstitutionality.291 She
emphasizes that there are many possible explanations for past congressional
inaction or for why a new congressional action might be unprecedented.292
These objections are similarly remedied by requiring a deliberate course of
practice together with the public sanction.293 Just as with repeated enactments
of a provision, the unconstitutionality of a law might be liquidated by repeated
debates in Congress about whether it can be enacted, culminating in its
rejection.294

287. Id. at 673.
288. Id. at 674.
289. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 103, at 320.
290. Cf. Letter from James Madison to George McDuffie, supra note 97 (discussing the

291.
292.
293.

294.

failure of the bank bill in 1811). That said, I am not sure that liquidation answers
Roisman’s argument against the use of acquiescence that is “coerced by political
circumstances.” See Roisman, supra note 286, at 693-95. The ultimate question for
liquidation is not whether the government officials really believed in the constitutional
arguments they articulated, but rather whether their interpretations reflected the
public sanction. See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1412-13 (2017).
See id. at 1427-48.
To be sure, Litman goes further, criticizing even an approach that applies only “in cases
involving statutes that prior Congresses did not enact because they harbored doubts
about the statutes’ constitutionality.” Id. at 1448. She suggests that this narrower
approach, much closer to liquidation, would be disruptive, inconsistent with
originalism, and unworkable. See id. at 1448-52. I hope that this Article’s elaboration of
liquidation will mitigate at least some of those concerns.
For an example, see Baude, supra note 27, at 1761-80 (describing repeated deliberations
rejecting Congress’s power of eminent domain).
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IV. Liquidating Liquidation? (Harder Questions)
As liquidation becomes part of our constitutional vocabulary, some harder
questions arise about its exact mechanics. In this Part, I address those questions
with the best inferences I can make from Madison’s theory. Because these issues
were not addressed as explicitly as the basic structure of liquidation described
above, I do so more tentatively. But if liquidation is to become or remain a part
of constitutional interpretation today, these are questions that will need to be
answered.
A. What Kinds of Provisions Can Be Liquidated?
Any provision of the Constitution can be indeterminate, at least in some
respect. Does that mean that every provision is equally susceptible to
liquidation? NLRB v. Noel Canning was a separation of powers case,295 as were
most of the cases it cited as examples of liquidation.296 And in explaining its
reliance on historical practice, the Court noted that “[f]or one thing, the
interpretive questions before us concern the allocation of power between two
elected branches of Government,”297 which seems to imply that historical
practice might not be relevant to other kinds of interpretive questions.298
Similarly, Curt Bradley and Trevor Morrison have focused on the use of
“historical practice in the separation of powers context,” observing that
“[r]elying on past practice in this area . . . does not typically raise concerns about
the oppression of minorities or other disadvantaged groups the way that it does
in some individual rights areas.”299 By contrast, Michael McConnell has
suggested that liquidation is also relevant to individual rights cases.300
It is plain that Madison’s idea of liquidation wasn’t limited only to
separation of powers cases. After all, the archetypical example of liquidation
was the controversy over the national bank, which was a question of
295. See 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014).
296. See id. at 2560. For the separation of powers cases cited by the Court, see Mistretta v.

297.
298.

299.
300.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668
(1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 674-76 (1929); Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119-20 (1925); and United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
490-91, 510 (1915) (Day, J., dissenting).
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559.
Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015) (“In separation-ofpowers cases this Court has often ‘put significant weight upon historical practice.’”
(quoting Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559)).
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 416; see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31, at 25.
See McConnell, supra note 27, at 1775-76 (citing Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2745
(2015); and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)); McConnell,
Tradition, supra note 282, at 175.
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federalism rather than of separation of powers. And even Noel Canning
repeatedly cited McCulloch as an example of liquidation.301 But McCulloch itself
had suggested that liquidation was appropriate because “the great principles of
liberty are not concerned.”302
Are individual rights cases different?
There is a modern intuition that individual rights should be inherently
countermajoritarian, and hence that notions like the public sanction should
have no bearing on them. But it is not clear that Founding-era thought
reflected that intuition.303 And because liquidation only takes place in areas of
indeterminacy, one could argue that it preserves whatever
countermajoritarian core is most important.
The specific mechanics of Madison’s model of republican legitimacy can
also be an odd fit for individual rights cases. Recall that under that model,
different groups of officials would compete for the popular sanction,
developing the “reason of the society.”304 That competition happens in most
conflicts over constitutional structure—whether between different
departments of the federal government or between federal and state
government entities. But in individual rights conflicts, government officials
may only be on one side of the dispute, so Madison’s republican model would
not squarely apply. That is the structural argument against liquidation of
individual rights provisions.
On the other hand, there are at least two arguments in favor. First, the
division between structure and rights may be somewhat artificial. Structure
was supposed to have the effect of protecting individual rights,305 and rights

301. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559-60. This is so despite the exchange between Madison

302.
303.

304.
305.

and Edward Everett highlighted by Larry Kramer. See supra text accompanying
notes 172-77. There, Madison arguably expressed doubt about how much liquidation
should account for the views of states—not whether it applied to views about states.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 253-54,
268-80 (2017) (arguing that with democratic consent governments could restrain
natural rights in service of the public good); see also Jud Campbell, Republicanism and
Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 86-87 (2017) (reviewing
RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016)) (“In short, natural rights called for good
government, not necessarily less government.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
See, e.g., Minutes of the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 382, 388 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)
(James Wilson: “[I]n a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed
for the United States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble
judgment, highly imprudent.”).
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sometimes have a structural component.306 Second, part of the point of
Madison’s model of legislative acquiescence was to ensure that a liquidated
decision had the “public sanction.”307 So even though an individual rights case
lacks a disagreement between two government entities, one of the government
entities has been replaced by the public itself. Maybe that provides an even
stronger source of legitimacy.
One further application that blurs the line between structure and rights is
in the enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments. Each of these
Amendments grants individual rights that Congress is empowered to “enforce”
through “appropriate legislation.”308 That enforcement necessarily requires
Congress to take a position on the scope of those individual rights. (There is
much debate over how much deference those positions deserve,309 but no doubt
that Congress may take a position.310) In cases where Congress exercises that
power vigorously, it may turn individual rights disputes into structural ones,
because the breadth of Congress’s power will be entangled with the breadth of
the constitutional right. And if Congress’s positions reflect a deliberate,
sanctioned course of practice, they could ultimately result in liquidation. Such a
possibility shows that even if liquidation is limited to structural provisions, it
will necessarily encompass many important questions of individual rights.
B. What Does Liquidation Decide?
Apart from the domain of liquidation, we might also ask about its scope.
How much, exactly, is settled by a given instance of liquidation? David Currie,
for instance, has maintained that while the constitutionality of the annexation
of Texas should be “considered settled” by practice, he was not ready to concede
that the annexation of any future state would be settled by the same rule.311 The
analogy, he argues, “is to res judicata, not stare decisis; what is settled is not the

306. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 25-26,

89-93, 123-33 (1998) (discussing the interaction between rights and structure).
307. See Letter from James Madison to Martin L. Hurlbut, supra note 70, at 372; supra text

accompanying notes 112-15.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
309. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric

Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 30-45 (2003) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s claim to exclusive authority over constitutional law).
310. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (acknowledging that “[i]t is for
Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966))).
311. See David P. Currie, Texas, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION,
1803-1898, supra note 108, at 111, 112.
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general principle but the particular case.”312 Michael Gerhardt has argued that
nonjudicial precedents are not “generally framed as rules or standards” and are
therefore hard to discern.313
Indeed, construed at its narrowest, the liquidation of the national bank
could settle only the constitutionality of the first bank, not any successors.
Alternatively, construed at its broadest, the bank episode might seem to stand
for the proposition that everything Alexander Hamilton said about broad
federal power was correct. Neither approach is satisfying.
The precedent analogy points us toward the answer. Because a liquidated
course of practice is a legislative precedent analogous to a judicial one, we
might try to ask what its “holding” was, just as we would ask about a judicial
precedent. So if the annexation issue had been liquidated, it could extend
beyond Texas. When there is a course of practice, we should ask what legal
question it necessarily decided.
For instance, Madison acquiesced in the constitutionality of the national
bank, upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland.314 But he did not acquiesce in
everything that the opinion said about national power, namely, the part he
called “the general & abstract doctrine interwoven with the decision on the
particular case.”315 Despite his acquiescence on the bank, he continued to reject
“the high sanction given to a latitude in expounding the Constitution”; what he
feared was the Court’s decision to “relinquish, by their doctrine, all controul on
the Legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers.”316 In disregarding this
part of the opinion he likened it to judicial dictum and suggested that it was less
reliable because it had “forego[ne] the illustration to be derived from a series of
cases actually occurring for adjudication.”317
This inquiry is made possible by one of the features of liquidation, the
requirement that the practice be a deliberate one in which the constitutional
question was expressly considered and debated. These debates make it easier for
the participants—and later readers—to know what was at stake.318 And indeed,
Madison linked the requirement of deliberation to the scope of a liquidated
practice when he warned against “the use made of precedents which can not be
312. Id.
313. GERHARDT, supra note 262, at 138; cf. Litman, supra note 291, at 1451

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

(“[O]perationalizing a principle concerned with identifying congressional consensus
that a statute is unconstitutional would likely prove inadministrable.”).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 501.
Id.; see also RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM: MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND AND
THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 102-03 (2007).
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 501.
Cf. GERHARDT, supra note 262, at 138-39 (“[T]he reasons given for particular actions
may also matter. . . . [I]t would help if [senators] explained their votes.”).
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supposed to have had, in the view of their authors, the bearing contended for,
and even where they may have crept, thro’ inadvertence, into Acts of
Congress.”319
To be sure, the dictum-holding distinction has sometimes proven elusive
in judicial precedent320 and may be more so in liquidation. The scope of
liquidation may also depend on external methodological commitments—that
is, on the many possible reasons one could have for using liquidation.321 But
our established norms of hunting for that distinction in case law may at least
guide us in drawing similar distinctions when looking at the scope of a given
liquidated practice.322
C. Is Liquidation Necessarily Permanent?
Richard Fallon has recently asked:
Once practice has “liquidated” the meaning of a constitutional term, does the
meaning as thus liquidated become fixed forever, or can evolving practice endow
vague or ambiguous terms with historically changing meanings? In the leading
historical study, Professor Caleb Nelson suggests that the former understanding
enjoyed broad currency in the Founding generation . . . .323

Indeed, Nelson maintains that “[i]n the absence of ‘extraordinary and
peculiar circumstances,’ . . . liquidations were expected to be permanent.”324
And he points as well to several instances in which Madison implied
permanence. During the 1789 congressional debates over the President’s
removal power, “Representative Madison reminded his colleagues that the
conclusion reflected in their statute would have lasting impact as a ‘permanent

319. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 95, at 191.
320. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 442

321.

322.
323.
324.

(1989) (“[S]imple dichotomies such as holding-dictum . . . do not adequately capture our
complex practices.”).
See Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 220 (2014) (“The
question of what a precedent ‘stands for’ cannot be determined in a vacuum. It depends
on a web of normative and methodological premises that determine the proper ends of
constitutional interpretation.”).
For a discussion of the holding-dictum distinction in the context of liquidation, see
Smith, supra note 224, at 637-40.
Fallon, supra note 29, at 1774; see also Nelson, Originalism, supra note 26.
Nelson, supra note 15, at 2453 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles J.
Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 185).
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exposition of the constitution.’”325 And there and elsewhere, Madison
associated liquidation with “fixing” the meaning of the constitutional text.326
Meanwhile, Michael McConnell has suggested that liquidation had a lesser,
but substantial, degree of permanence. He writes that “[p]resumably, this
‘fixing’ is not irrevocable,” but also suggests that “departures require substantial
justification and a similar process of deliberation and widespread
acceptance.”327 Liquidation plainly was supposed to have at least some
prospective binding force. The very point of the liquidation concept was to
give future interpreters a narrower range of meanings than earlier interpreters
had. But the harder question is how binding it was.
Once again, answering this question requires some inference, but the
analogy to precedent suggests that liquidation is not necessarily permanent.
It may help to consider the matter from two different perspectives. First,
take the position of a contemporary interpreter looking back at the sweep of
constitutional history. Suppose that for decades, a course of practice seemed to
confirm one view and to represent a liquidated constitutional settlement. But
later, somehow, a contrary practice took over. This new contrary practice was
itself debated, but then became liquidated by a similar course of practice. What
should the modern interpreter do?
The answer, suggests the precedent analogy, is to follow the later practice,
not to treat the first practice as permanent and inviolate. Under both historical
and modern doctrines of precedent, it was and is generally accepted that later
precedent, once established, is controlling. As a matter of modern stare decisis,
this is obvious. For instance, in 2015, the Supreme Court found a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage,328 contrary to a 1972 appeal in which it found that
a claimed right to same-sex marriage presented no “substantial federal
question.”329 We all understand that going forward it is the 2015 opinion that
establishes a precedent, and that all lower courts are expected to obey it.

325. Nelson, Originalism, supra note 26, at 527 (quoting The Congressional Register, supra

326.
327.
328.
329.

note 4, at 921 (statement of Rep. Madison); and The Daily Advertiser, supra note 4, at
895 (statement of Rep. Madison)).
See id. at 527-29; see also id. at 530-36 (discussing the notion of “fixing” meaning in the
context of eighteenth-century lexicography).
McConnell, supra note 27, at 1774.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. The
Court dismissed the appeal from Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC330 is
precedent even though it overruled parts of the 2003 decision in McConnell v.
FEC,331 and lower courts are expected to obey.332 The examples are so plentiful
as to be banal.333
Keeping in mind that Founding-era precedent emphasized lines of cases,
the same idea nonetheless obtained when one line of cases was replaced by
another. If the custom had once been X, but now the custom was Y, then the
binding custom was Y. That is the logical implication of the Founding-era
recognitions “that regional common law in America deviated in parts
significantly from its English model”334 and that, for instance, “various
customs” had “materially altered” the “common law” in Massachusetts.335 And
it is reflected in Matthew Hale’s History of the Common Law, which described the
common law as changing over time “to be accommodated to the Conditions,
Exigencies and Conveniencies of the People . . . as those Exigencies and
Conveniencies do insensibly grow” so that “it is not possible to assign the
certain Time when the Change began.”336

330. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
331. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
332. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516 (2012) (per curiam) (“The

333.

334.
335.

336.

question presented in this case is whether the holding of Citizens United applies to the
Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does.”).
Michael Stokes Paulsen has argued that under modern doctrine, “[w]hen earlier
Precedent A (or line of cases) is inconsistent with later Precedent B (or line of cases),
either one may be overruled,” depending on which one is incorrect. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of
Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1561 (2000). If that is right, it still means that earlier
precedents qua precedents do not control later ones.
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 575
(2006).
See id. at 576 (quoting LETTER OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT TO HIS
EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR, WITH TWO JUDICIARY BILLS DRAWN BY THEM 11-12
(Boston, Young & Minns 1804)); see also Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the
Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 382 (2006) (“As for change, the common law,
while an identifiable body of customs and rules, was not a static body of customs and
rules. New customs developed to meet new situations. In keeping with this principle,
James Kent explained that while settlers had taken the English common law with them
to America, it was retained only ‘so far as it was adapted to our institutions and
circumstances.’” (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *343 (O.W.
Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826))).
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 57-58 (London, E.
Nutt 2d ed. corrected 1716); see also McConnell, Tradition, supra note 282, at 186-89
(describing the popularity of Hale’s view in America).
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If it is right that contemporary lines of precedent controlled over ancient
lines of precedent,337 then the same should have been true under Madison’s
theory of liquidation. In other words, the analogy suggests that in practice,
liquidated provisions can be unliquidated or reliquidated.338 If a constitutional
issue had been debated and settled over one period of time, but later debates had
deviated from the original liquidation, the Madisonian view implies that later
interpreters should follow the later practice, just as we would expect later
judges to follow a later precedent. This is also consistent with liquidation’s goal
of providing stability by matching meaning to publicly accepted practice.
But now consider the matter from the perspective of a person at the time
that the first practice remains settled. That person is not free to simply create a
new, contrary practice on his own initiative. The fact that subsequent
liquidations, once established, can control earlier ones does not mean that one
is free to initiate a reliquidation. So how might such a subsequent practice
legitimately arise?
The most obvious possibility is that subsequent interpreters would simply
decide that the previous liquidation was just sufficiently bad on normative
grounds. There are hints of this idea in Madison’s writings about liquidation. In
a letter to Reynolds Chapman he described a binding liquidation as being one
“obviously conformable to the public good,”339 which implies that a liquidation
that was not good might not be binding. Another set of letters is even more
explicit. To Charles Haynes, Madison wrote: “That cases may occur which
transcend all authority of precedents, must be admitted, but they form
exceptions which will speak for themselves and must justify themselves.”340

337. Note that this is not entirely free from doubt. For instance, Thomas Jefferson

apparently “insisted on a very specific temporality for the common law, dating it back
before the Magna Carta,” and invoked pre-Magna Carta judicial decisions as against
contemporary ones. See Meyler, supra note 334, at 568-69; cf. Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra
note 26, at 21-27 (discussing competing views of the common law in the early republic).
But it is not so clear whether Jefferson really meant to claim that older judicial customs
trumped newer ones, or if he meant instead to deny that the later decisions were really
established, or perhaps to appeal to “external” principles, see Nelson, Stare Decisis, supra
note 26, at 25, in the same vein as unambiguous constitutional text. See generally
Julius S. Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, in ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451, 465-67 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969) (describing
Jefferson’s views about the common law as stemming from the Saxon-Norman
conflict).
338. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31, at 34 (making this analogy).
339. Letter from James Madison to Reynolds Chapman, supra note 89, at 434.
340. Letter from James Madison to Charles E. Haynes, supra note 93, at 443.
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To Charles Ingersoll, he wrote: “That there may be extraordinary & peculiar
circumstances controuling the rule . . . may be admitted . . . .”341 And a set of
notes on his correspondence about tariffs with Joseph Cabell say:
Altho’ it might be too much to say that no case could arise, of a character overruling the highest evidence of precedents & practice, in expounding a
Constitution, it may be safely affirmed that no case wch. is not of a character far
more exorbitant & ruinous than any now existing or that has occurred, can
authorize a disregard of the precedents & practice . . . .342

But these hints are fairly vague, and liquidation would not accomplish
what Madison tasked it to do if ordinary normative disagreement were a
sufficient ground for ignoring it. For liquidation to overrule individual
opinions, or to explain why Madison was now making common cause with
those who supported the bank,343 it must surmount at least some ordinary
normative disagreements.
Another way that a liquidation could nonetheless be overcome in practice
is if subsequent interpreters decided that the constitutional provision was fully
determinate in the first place. Because constitutional indeterminacy is a
prerequisite to liquidation, such a provision should never have been liquidated
at all—the interpretation would “alter” the Constitution rather than merely
“expound” it.344
Relatedly, because people can disagree about indeterminacy itself,
sometimes a small group that passionately (even if wrongly!) believes a
constitutional provision to be determinate can successfully undermine a
liquidated practice. For instance, one might conclude, as the Noel Canning Court
did, that the Constitution was ambiguous as to whether “the phrase ‘vacancies
that may happen during the recess of the Senate’” includes only “vacancies that
initially occur during a recess” or also “vacancies that initially occur before a
recess and continue to exist during the recess.”345 And by 1862, one might have
concluded, as Attorney General Edward Bates did, that though he “might have
serious doubts” if considering the issue “for the first time,” the broader position
was “settled . . . by the continued practice” of previous Presidents and attorneys
general, “and sanctioned . . . by the unbroken acquiescence of the Senate.”346
341. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 185.
342. James Madison, Notes on Letters to Mr. Cabell (1828), https://perma.cc/J23N-2DPU,

343.
344.
345.
346.

reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 49, at 322 n.1, 324 n.1. For
one of the Cabell letters, see Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell, supra
note 96.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-55; supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
See Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014) (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3).
President’s Appointing Power, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 356 (1862).
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(Indeed, the practice had even crossed the front: The Confederacy’s Attorney
General, Thomas Hill Watts, concluded that the “uniform and settled
construction” of the Union’s Recess Appointments Clause, as of 1861, had been
incorporated into the Confederate Constitution’s near-identical clause.)347
But just after Bates’s conclusion, the Senate responded that Bates was
wrong. A report by the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged “the great
weight which such a continued practical construction is entitled to in
considering the meaning and intent of a doubtful clause in a public act.”348 But it
found “the language too plain to admit of a doubt or to need interpretation,”
and thought the narrower interpretation unambiguously required.349 Congress
subsequently implemented the report by passing legislation that eliminated
salaries for recess appointments when the “vacancy existed while the Senate
was in session.”350 Even for those who think the Recess Appointments Clause
ambiguous, that legislation might have begun a new, liquidated understanding
if it were confirmed by a subsequent course of practice.351
Similarly, Madison thought that the bank’s constitutionality was
ultimately liquidated by a course of practice.352 President Jackson, by contrast,
thought that its constitutionality had not yet been “well settled,” and that
precedents drawn from Congress “were equal” on both sides, while those from
the states “have been probably . . . 4 to 1” against it.353 Even if Jackson was
wrong, his very veto sparked subsequent events that threatened to disrupt the
bank’s liquidated status.354 Indeed, had events been slightly different, it is
possible that the veto could have led to the overruling of McCulloch and to the
development of a new liquidated understanding of congressional power.

347. See Letter from Thomas Hill Watts, Attorney Gen., to John Reagan, Post-Master-Gen.

348.
349.
350.
351.

352.
353.
354.

(May 8, 1863), in THE OPINIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 1861-1865,
at 261, 261-64 (Rembert W. Patrick ed., 1950); see also Alison L. LaCroix, Continuity in
Secession: The Case of the Confederate Constitution, in NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, supra note 67, at 274, 289-93 (discussing the
pervasive Confederate incorporation of Union practice and precedent).
S. REP. NO. 37-80, at 7 (1863). The report had been written at the request of the full
Senate. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 100 (1862).
S. REP. NO. 37-80, at 7.
Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 642, 646.
It is debatable to what extent subsequent practice confirmed the Senate’s position, and
the statute was amended in 1940. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2572 (2014)
(“In any event, the Senate subsequently abandoned its hostility.”); see also Act of July 11,
1940, Pub. L. No. 76-738, 54 Stat. 751.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-42.
Jackson 1832 Veto Message, supra note 50, at 581-82.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-55; supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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It might be the case that liquidation was expected to be permanent,355 but
these expectations might not always come true. Rather, these examples help us
see how liquidation is indeed “not irrevocable,” and how one liquidated
understanding can be replaced with another through “a similar process of
deliberation and widespread acceptance.”356 At the same time, they do not
necessarily imply that such a process of abandonment can begin for purely
normative reasons, even with a “substantial justification.”357
D. Is Early Practice Privileged?
Once again, Richard Fallon has put the question well: “Is the capacity to
‘liquidate’ or settle meaning limited to practices that began closely proximately
in time to the Constitution’s adoption, or can liquidation occur through later
practice?”358 Curt Bradley and Neil Siegel similarly have noted the uncertainty
whether liquidation “may occur only through early post-Founding practice, or
whether it also may occur through later practice long after the Founding,” and
write that their “best sense . . . is that the liquidation concept turns on initial
practice, which typically although not necessarily will be early practice.”359
Some scholars seem to make similar assumptions;360 others seem to assume
that later practices can liquidate, too.361
Privileging early practice through liquidation is tempting but wrong. First
the temptation: Connecting liquidation specifically to early practice might
explain the many scholarly and judicial writings that seem to privilege the
constitutional views of President Washington and of the First Congress. For
example, Akhil Amar has argued that “[s]everal basic features of America’s
enduring presidential system have been established less by the Constitution’s
text than by the gloss on the text provided by President Washington’s actions,”

355. See Nelson, supra note 15, at 2453.
356. McConnell, supra note 27, at 1774.
357. See id.
358. Fallon, supra note 29, at 1774.
359. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31, at 29-30.
360. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Essay, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act

of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609, 637-38 (2003); John F. Manning, Comment, The
Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1285, 1326 n.149 (1999); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1165, 1233 (2014) (supplementing this assumption with normative and structural
arguments that “historical practice ought to matter if it emerged in the first few
decades of constitutional history, but perhaps less so otherwise”).
361. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
786-87 (2010) (rejecting the view of “many prominent originalists” that “would accept
only those liquidating precedents that arose close in time to the founding”).
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and that the text “invites” us to read it as implicitly “delegat[ing] authority to
George Washington to fill in the blanks of Article II and thereby sharpen the
role of all future presidents.”362
Similarly, the First Congress is said to have “breathed life into the
Constitution” and “established precedents that still guide the nation’s
government.”363 The Supreme Court has said that “[a]n Act ‘passed by the first
Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members had
taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and weighty
evidence of its true meaning.’”364 Other cases have similar formulations.365 The
invocations are so frequent that one observer has coined the term “the First
Congress canon” to describe the practice.366
Despite its intuitive force, this is not Madison’s theory of liquidation, for
much the same reason that liquidation is not entirely permanent. Liquidation
proceeded by analogy to precedent. Madison’s argument for allowing postFounding practice to liquidate constitutional meaning was never, so far as I can
tell, that there had been a delegation of implicit authority specifically to the
post-Founding generation.367 It is rather that the repeated, sanctioned activity
of public officials could create a form of constitutional precedent. And just as
precedents can be established by judges 50 or 100 or 231 years after the
Founding, so too can they be established by other officials 50 or 100 or 231
years after the Founding. Indeterminate provisions remain open to liquidation
for as long as their meanings remain contested.368
362. AMAR, supra note 57, at 313-14. To be clear, Amar rightly recognizes this argument as

363.

364.

365.
366.
367.

368.

separate from the use of “institutional practice[]” to “gloss and clarify the text.” See id. at
335.
FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE
WASHINGTON, AND A GROUP OF EXTRAORDINARY MEN INVENTED THE GOVERNMENT 1
(2016).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888), abrogated in other part by
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935)).
See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884).
See Michael Bhargava, Comment, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of
History, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1745 (2006).
But see Nelson, Originalism, supra note 26, at 551 (“[R]easonable members of the
founding generation . . . might conceivably have read each indeterminate provision in
the Constitution not only to define a range of permissible interpretations, but also to
delegate power to the provision’s initial interpreters to make an authoritative selection
within that range.”).
This implies that in Noel Canning, Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court was right to
look to practice “even when that practice began after the founding era,” NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014), despite Justice Scalia’s criticism on this point, see
id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Bradley & Siegel, supra
note 31, at 18 (noting this dispute).

60

Constitutional Liquidation
71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019)

To be sure, the first generation of public officials may still have hoped and
aspired that the liquidations created by their practices would last and be given
special status, just as courts generally hope that judicial opinions they write
will not be overruled. That may explain Madison’s reference to the possibility
of a “permanent exposition of the constitution,”369 or his early suggestion that
his work in Congress would “become every day more easy” as “the novelty of
the business” decreased.370 Indeed, in that letter he noted that “the exposition of
the Constitution is frequently a copious source” of difficulty “and must
continue so until its meaning on all great points shall have been settled by
precedents.”371 Similarly, Madison apparently hoped that “the Constitution
should be well settled by practice” before he decided to release his notes from
the Constitutional Convention.372 These references to permanent settlement
do not necessarily reflect a belief that liquidation is definitionally permanent,
but rather something like the Supreme Court’s hope that “contending sides”
will ultimately agree to “accept[] a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution,” that is, the Court’s precedent.373
So does this mean that there is no reason at all to privilege the first postFounding practices? Ought constitutional interpretation to stop focusing so
heavily on the Decision of 1789,374 the first congressional chaplains,375 or even
the establishment of the national bank?
I would not go that far. It is true that seen purely as a matter of liquidation,
such decisions retain relevance only to the extent they continue to represent a
liquidation with the force of law. But such decisions have interpretive
relevance for an additional reason, namely that they can reflect some
information about the Constitution’s original meaning. Even though their
practices came after the text was enacted, it may be possible “to derive evidence

369. See The Congressional Register, supra note 4, at 921 (statement of Rep. Madison);

The Daily Advertiser, supra note 4, at 895 (statement of Rep. Madison).
370. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston, supra note 81, at 250.
371. Id.
372. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), https://perma.cc

/7X9T-AHWP, reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES, supra
note 85, at 381, 381. Madison implied that he expected this settlement might even
happen before his death! See id.
373. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
374. See generally Prakash, supra note 38.
375. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-90 (1983).

61

Constitutional Liquidation
71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019)

about the meaning of a text by consulting the interpretations of those who
have the familiarity with the relevant context and linguistic conventions,”376
that is to say, the framing generation.
To be sure, this information is only “reflected light,”377 and there are many
cautions about the extent to which postratification statements by members of
the framing generation should be used as evidence of original meaning.378 But
they are a potentially important source of information nonetheless, and that
importance provides some limited justification for the special interpretive
status given to the First Congress379 and even to George Washington.380
Almost all interpreters, even non-originalists, give original meaning at least
some weight in constitutional interpretation.381 So to the extent that original
meaning has some weight, post-Founding practice is relevant because it
provides some evidence of that meaning.
In sum, members of the first post-Founding generation are not given
privileged place by the theory of liquidation. Their decisions had the same
capacity to liquidate as anybody else’s. But they have some additional weight, as
they reflect original meaning. To the extent that constitutional interpreters

376. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 86 n.334

377.

378.

379.

380.

381.

(2001) (citing Kent Greenawalt, Essay, The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1997)).
See Baude, supra note 27, at 1811; see also Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the
Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 656-57 (2013) (discussing the use of “postratification history” to “shed light on adoption history”); Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984-86 (1995) (discussing
such use in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment).
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (1994); Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 247-48 (2004).
See William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial
Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 770 (1997) (“This interpretive principle should apply with
even greater force to Article III matters, given that Oliver Ellsworth was both the
primary architect of the Judiciary and Process Acts of 1789 and a member of the
Constitutional Convention’s Committee of Detail, which was responsible for adding
the phrase ‘judicial Power’ to the Constitution.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Graber,
supra note 360, at 637.
On this theory, what matters about Washington is not so much that he was delegated
the first presidency, as Amar argues, see AMAR, supra note 57, at 313-14, but rather that
he was deeply immersed in the ratification of the Constitution, see generally EDWARD J.
LARSON, THE RETURN OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1783-1789, at 187-233 (2014).
See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 & n.21 (2009);
Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997).
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give weight to original meaning, they could be justified in giving these earliest
practices special attention. But interpreters should be careful to disentangle the
importance of these practices as a matter of liquidation from their indirect
relevance to original meaning.
E. Is Liquidation Meaningfully Distinct?
If liquidation is defined in these ways—as applying to all constitutional
provisions, and as looking to the most recent settled practice rather than
privileging early practice or the first fixed practice—a final question is whether
liquidation is really meaningfully distinct from other methods of giving
weight to historical practice.
In particular, this understanding puts liquidation more in line with the
family of theories referred to as historical “gloss,” after Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in Youngstown:
The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the way the
framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated
according to its true nature. Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting
government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give
meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the
Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In
short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge
of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have
also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive
Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.382

This theory of gloss has been most comprehensively expounded by Curt
Bradley in a series of articles, some written with Trevor Morrison and Neil
Siegel. In places, they have suggested gloss to be different from the technical
concept of liquidation, but that may be because they understand liquidation to
focus on early practice.383 If that assumption is wrong, it raises the question
whether liquidation and gloss have collapsed into one another.384
382. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring).
383. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31, at 29-41; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at

424 n.47, 478-79; Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 773, 800-01, 801 n.148 (2014) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Termination]; see also
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 262 (2017) (“The relationship between the
historical gloss approach and the concept of liquidation is uncertain because little has
been written about liquidation.”).
384. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31, at 29. Indeed, though the Noel Canning majority
opinion does not use the word “gloss,” its references to Justice Frankfurter’s Youngstown
footnote continued on next page
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Maybe so. But liquidation has both a different pedigree and a different
theoretical apparatus, and so it therefore seems to diverge from (or add to) the
“gloss” project in at least three ways.
One way is through a different attitude toward the constitutional text. In
liquidation, one must first ascertain that the constitutional text is
indeterminate—that is, has a range of possible meanings. Subsequent practice
can then narrow this range of possible meanings. Justice Frankfurter, by
contrast, suggested that practice can “give meaning to the words of a text or
supply them.”385 To be sure, Justice Frankfurter did say that practice “cannot
supplant the Constitution,” but the passage implies that he envisioned looking
to practice first and text second, rather than the other way around.386 The
modern gloss theorists do also stress the relevance of ambiguity,387 but they do
not appear to view ambiguity as a hard boundary in the same way that
liquidation does.388
A second way is through a different understanding of the relevant practice.
Justice Frankfurter’s gloss focused on what those in power have actually done—
whether an “exercise of power” has been made “part of the structure of our
government.”389 It is enough, apparently, that a longstanding course of action
has been “never before questioned.”390 Actions speak louder than words.
Liquidation, by contrast, requires that the course of practice be the result of
constitutional deliberation—and hence more than just silence.391 (This
difference may reflect different theoretical foundations—gloss seems to care

385.
386.

387.
388.

389.
390.
391.

concurrence appear to treat it as similar to liquidation. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134
S. Ct. 2550, 2560, 2573 (2014).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 610-11. On the effect of this kind of ordering, see generally Adam M. Samaha,
Starting with the Text—On Sequencing Effects in Statutory Interpretation and Beyond,
8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439 (2016).
See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 430-32.
See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 383, at 830 n.317; see also Curtis A. Bradley &
Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213,
1241-42 (2015) (“[T]his standard bifurcation between clear and unclear text tends to
overlook an important aspect of American interpretive practice: the same
considerations that are potentially relevant in resolving the meaning of ambiguous
text can also affect the perceived clarity of the text in the first instance.”).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id.
Some modern gloss theorists would also “strongly prefer affirmative evidence” of
acquiescence and “not just silence.” See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 451. But
even so, gloss does not necessarily require evidence of “shared constitutional
understandings.” See Curtis A. Bradley, Essay, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 73-74
(2017).
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about what government officials have found workable;392 liquidation
ultimately cares about what the people, through the fiction of representation,
have found acceptable.)
Finally, Bradley has suggested that gloss could be a family of different
theories, in which the specific form of gloss depends on one’s justification for
adhering to it.393 If so, it is possible that liquidation is actually a specific kind of
gloss, whose specific rules relate to its specific justifications. Originalists might
use liquidation because of its Founding-era pedigree. Burkeans might use
liquidation because of its connections to tradition. Popular constitutionalists
might use liquidation because of its incorporation of the public sanction.394
Formalists might use liquidation because its theoretical apparatus provides a
more structured, less “slippery” way to use historical practice.395
Liquidation also diverges from Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional
moments” at which a particular string of political practice and popular
ratification can effectively amend the written Constitution.396 Again, the two
methods have some commonalities—both look to deliberate constitutional
practice and subsequent acquiescence reflecting the public sanction. But
liquidation is less epic, and more quotidian, in two respects. First, liquidation
requires constitutional ambiguity as a gateway, which is why it can “expound”
the Constitution but cannot “alter” it.397 By contrast, Ackerman’s
constitutional moments act as a complete alternative to formalist and
392. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The Constitution is a

393.

394.
395.

396.
397.

framework for government. Therefore the way the framework has consistently
operated fairly establishes that it has operated according to its true nature.”); see also
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432-35 (discussing how much weight to give
historical practice where “the political branches have settled upon an institutional
arrangement that they both deem desirable or at least practically workable and
acceptable”).
See Bradley, Doing Gloss, supra note 391, at 59-60; see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 31,
at 21 (“There are differing accounts of when such gloss should be credited and some of
them do not precisely track Justice Frankfurter’s articulation . . . .”); cf. Richard H.
Fallon Jr., Essay, Arguing in Good Faith About the Constitution: Ideology, Methodology, and
Reflective Equilibrium, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 134 (2017) (“Potentially distinct from the
concept of liquidation—because it can be broader—is that of a ‘historical gloss’ on
constitutional meaning.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
Cf. LaCroix, supra note 2, at 77-78 (“Historical practice is a slippery, unhelpfully
capacious notion masquerading as a . . . neutral principle.”).
Three of these justifications are not among the four considered by Bradley. See Bradley,
Doing Gloss, supra note 391, at 64-67. Bradley does consider “Burkean consequentialism,”
see id. at 66-67, which as we have seen comprises a distinct subset of the arguments for
tradition, see supra Part III.C.
See generally ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 108, at 160-85, 316-42.
See Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
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textualist theories that rely exclusively on the Article V amendment
process.398 Second, liquidation can happen on mundane constitutional
questions that do not attract much public notice. By contrast, constitutional
moments rely on the unusual activation of the people.399 The public sanction
acquired by a constitutional moment must be direct. Liquidation, by contrast,
can be refracted through representative republicanism.
F. How Is Indeterminancy Determined?
A theory dependent on constitutional indeterminacy naturally prompts
the question: What makes a constitutional provision indeterminate? Adopting
Madison’s perspective provides some basic answers. First of all, Madison
plainly envisioned that some applications of the Constitution were
unambiguously fixed, despite subsequent practice. That is why a constitutional
indeterminacy was a prerequisite to liquidation,400 and why Madison
simultaneously stressed that subsequent legislative activity could not
“controul[] or var[y]”401 or “alter”402 the Constitution. Hence, while Madison
stated in Federalist No. 37 that all new laws contained ambiguity (were “more or
less obscure and equivocal”),403 one should not mistakenly infer that he meant
that all new laws were ambiguous in every respect.
Contrary to one recent piece of scholarship, this is an important difference
between Madison’s views of language and those of more modern thinkers like
Ludwig Wittgenstein.404 For Wittgenstein and his followers, use is the
touchstone of meaning.405 Under liquidation, subsequent practice is relevant
only interstitially—only when textual meaning is unclear.406 To read
Wittgenstein into Madison is to be heedless of Madison’s warnings about
congressional alteration of the Constitution.407
398. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 108, at 15-17, 28-29, 183-85, 342-44.
399. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 108, at 266-69; ACKERMAN,

TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 108, at 4-6.
400. See supra Part II.B.1.
401. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll, supra note 83, at 184.
402. Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist, supra note 49, at 477.
403. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 236.
404. But see Ream, supra note 27, at 1666 (“Madison’s idea of liquidation, though not mixed

on the same philosophical palette as Wittgenstein’s later thinking, turns out in practice
to paint a similar picture of constitutional meaning as use in the ongoing activity of
constitutional interpretation.”).
405. See id. at 1665-66.
406. See supra Part II.B.1.
407. Ream does acknowledge “important differences” between “Wittgensteinian usemeaning” and “Madisonian use-meaning,” but the indeterminacy requirement is not
among them. See Ream, supra note 27, at 1670-73.
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Second, in other writings Madison also set out various precepts of
constitutional interpretation that can be used to tell us what those clear textual
applications are. For instance, he advocated that “the legitimate meaning of the
Instrument must be derived from the text itself; or if a key is to be sought
elsewhere, it must be . . . in the sense attached to it by the people in their
respective State Conventions where it [received] all the authority which it
possesses.”408 And Madison specifically rejected interpreting the text “in the
changeable meaning of the words composing it,” emphasizing again “the
propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation.”409 Indeed, he wrote, “[i]n that sense alone it is the
legitimate Constitution.”410 He also emphasized the “reasonable medium
between expounding the Constitution with the strictness of a penal or other
ordinary Statute, and expounding it with a laxity, which may vary its essential
character.”411
To be sure, modern scholarship has raised questions about ambiguity that
Madison did not address. For instance, indeterminacy can refer to one
individual’s internal uncertainty about meaning, or instead to the extent of
disagreement about meaning between individuals.412 Madison did not address
this issue directly, and passingly appears to have swept in both types of
indeterminacy.413 Nor did Madison specify an exact quantitative threshold of
uncertainty or disagreement for a provision to lack determinate meaning.414 A
fully liquidated theory of liquidation might ultimately need to answer these
questions too, but Madisonian precepts could go a long way toward outlining
where the Constitution is indeterminate.
Things are more difficult, however, if we have so much disagreement over
theories of interpretation more generally that we cannot even agree on the
proper methods for finding ambiguity. Indeed, it might seem as if liquidation

408. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie, supra note 372, at 381.
409. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), https://perma.cc/QNX5

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

-3DML, reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 338, 339
(David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2016).
Id.
Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 503.
See Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal
Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 258-60, 277-79 (2010).
See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane, supra note 48, at 502 (referring both
to “difficulties and differences of opinion”).
Cf. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2136-39
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (noting the lack of
a settled answer to this question in statutory interpretation generally).
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necessarily falls apart if we don’t all share Madison’s first-order theories of
constitutional interpretation, or at least share some method for finding
ambiguity.
Even so, liquidation may remain perfectly workable. So long as we each
have our own criteria for finding indeterminacy, we can reach an incompletely
theorized agreement to use liquidation in the face of such indeterminacies, for
reasons rooted in precedent, tradition, and compromise. An analogy might be
to the modern rule of Chevron deference, which calls for deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, but only after a court has “employ[ed]
traditional tools of statutory construction.”415 If judges disagree on what those
traditional tools are or how to employ them, they will disagree on when
ambiguity exists, but the Chevron doctrine may still be able to function despite
this disagreement.416
But as a more practical matter, one is entitled to wonder. Without settled
conventions on how to find indeterminacy or how to interpret, will
liquidation really accomplish Madison’s goals, or ours? The more that
indeterminacy itself is indeterminate, the greater the risk that each interpreter
will find indeterminacy whenever liquidation is convenient for her, and avoid
it when liquidation is inconvenient.417 Constitutional ambiguity might no
longer be a gateway for liquidation but will be constructed according to the
desirability of liquidation.418 And in turn, liquidation will no longer serve as a
constraint on constitutional decisionmaking but rather as a new degree of
freedom.
I am not convinced we yet live in such a disarrayed world, but its
possibility is a reminder that liquidation is not the solution to all constitutional
disagreement. Nor is it a substitute for first-order constitutional theory about
the interpretation of the Constitution. It is but a helpful tool to help us resolve
constitutional disputes when the text alone cannot.

415. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); see id. at

842-43.
416. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF

LEGAL INTERPRETATION 188-89, 201-02 (2006). But see Kavanaugh, supra note 414, at
2154 (criticizing the Chevron doctrine as “indeterminate—and thus . . . antithetical to the
neutral, impartial rule of law—because of the initial clarity versus ambiguity decision”).
417. Cf. William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 539, 559-60 (2017) (expressing misgivings about the manipulability of the clarityambiguity threshold).
418. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 388, at 1238-67; see also Richard Primus, Unbundling
Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1098 n.45, 1103 n.59 (2013) (arguing that textual
plausibility depends on current needs).
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Conclusion
As with “a new form of . . . verse,” Phillip Bobbitt tells us, “few things that
can happen in the life of this nation are more important than the introduction
of a new form of constitutional argument.”419 Even if the argument has been
latent in legal culture for centuries, a new reading can “create[] [its] own
precursors by giving us a systematic way in which to read them.”420
I do not know whether liquidation should be labeled as a new form of
constitutional argument, or rather should expand our understanding of the
recognized forms of text, history, and precedent.421 Either way, it has been left
out of the existing typologies for too long. The time has come to reconstruct
and evaluate Madison’s vision of liquidation. As with Madison’s other
handiwork, whether we adopt or reject it, we will learn much from it. And we
just might be able to put it to some use.

419. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 77 (1982)

(quoting T.S. Eliot, Introduction to SENECA: HIS TENNE TRAGEDIES; TRANSLATED INTO
ENGLISH, at v, xlix-l (Thomas Newton ed., Ind. Univ. Press 1927) (1581)).
420. See id. at 76-77.
421. Compare Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1364, 1383-84 (1994) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (describing
argument from presidential practice as a “kind[] of precedent” and perhaps “doctrinal”),
with Philip C. Bobbitt, Feature, The Age of Consent, 123 YALE L.J. 2334, 2372 n.140 (2014)
(“[D]octrinal argument—that is, the record of congressional and presidential practice
that parallels the decision of cases and controversies by courts—is dispositive only to
the extent of the most recent ‘holdings.’”).
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Methodological Appendix
James Madison’s writings are a major source in this Article. Wherever
possible, I have relied on the Papers of James Madison project, now directed by
J.C.A. Stagg at the University of Virginia, which aims to become “a complete,
comprehensive, and annotated edition of the entire corpus of Madison’s
correspondence and other papers,” by contrast to earlier, “incomplete”
compilations that were “marred by errors and other editorial misjudgments
that have severely limited their utility for the purposes of modern historical
scholarship.”422
However, that collection has not yet finished publication of some of
Madison’s papers, such as his letters sent after February 1826. These later
documents will eventually be included in The Papers of James Madison and are
now made available in verified transcriptions by the Founders Early Access
project, which has “copied carefully and faithfully” the original manuscripts, and
matched “the current editorial style in use by The Papers of James Madison . . . as
closely as possible,” but which cautions that the documents “should . . . not be
cited in formal research.”423 For these later letters, I have provided a link to the
Founders Early Access transcriptions in the footnotes as an aid to the reader, as
well as a citation to another published copy where possible. With one relevant
exception,424 the differences between the Founders Early Access documents and
other available copies are minor.

422. History of The Papers of James Madison, ROTUNDA, https://perma.cc/94L7-6XMC

(archived Oct. 5, 2018).
423. About Early Access Madison Documents, ROTUNDA, https://perma.cc/9VEP-CMHL

(archived Oct. 5, 2018).
424. See supra note 111.
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